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ABSTRACT
Fifty years ago, in the city of Idyllic Isle, America,1 an artist created a sculpture
for the city. The artist’s focus was on remedying the sordid history of Idyllic Isle, a city
that was not always so peaceful. Long ago, the city was overrun with racism, hateful
propaganda advancing minority oppression, government corruption, and disregard for
its coastal environment. Over the years, the city improved, but still had not reached its
potential. The artist decided that he wanted to erect a sculpture on the publicly-owned
land overlooking the city’s coastal waters. The government agreed that he could place
the statue on the land as he wished, since there were no other plans for the land and the
government wanted to rehabilitate it into a park space for its citizens. The sculpture,
entitled Bliss is Ignorance, depicted a scene of a beaten-down woman of ethnically
ambiguous descent on her knees with her arm outstretched, reaching forward with hope
in her eyes. She was placed under the foot of a powerful man walking over her while
laughing and dropping donut crumbs onto the ground next to her with one hand, the
other hand on his hip. His clothing was emblazoned with “Anti-X” slogans—phrases
signifying anti-minority sentiments—and was affixed with a government badge. While her
eyes were open and hopeful, his were shut as he laughed. The artist was proud of this
work; it depicted his vision for society—a body of people moving toward a better future
while recognizing its past of racial hatred, governmental corruption, and pollution. He
cast his signature on the base—as he always did on his works—and presented the statue
to the government of Idyllic Isle, which installed the statue of the scene on its coastal
public land.
At present, Idyllic Isle is a booming, progressive city. It has incredible
representation of diverse persons in government; has a culture of “zero tolerance” for
hate; and it is pristine. All of its citizens are proud to live there and the city boasts nearzero unemployment or poverty. Minority women are high-ranking and hold plenty of
executive positions. The government is full of upright, law-abiding officials who are just
and fair. The city is full of parks and encourages public art installations to beautify the
land for people to enjoy. However, there is burgeoning discontent among citizens
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regarding the value of certain works of the city’s public art, given how wonderful a place
Idyllic Isle has become. One of these contested works is Bliss is Ignorance.
Three years ago, voters elected a mayor who had been vocal during his campaign
about the need to preserve all public statues and public art—citing the “importance of
history” as his reason. The mayor continues to believe this, making this view a part of his
re-election campaign. However, the majority opinion in Idyllic Isle has shifted, and now
the majority expresses a desire to remove public art that no longer appeals to the city’s
sense of identity. Criticism has started bubbling as to the social purpose the statue now
serves.
Given the rise of strong, powerful minority women in the city and their celebration
of having a voice, some citizens feel repulsed by the idea of walking along the coastal
lands and seeing a minority woman being trampled over by a hateful male governmental
official. Social justice groups find the statue’s “Anti-X” slogans to be both offensive and
hateful reminders of past racial tensions. Preservationist groups and environmentally
focused individuals resent the depiction of littering due to fear that it may encourage
young children to pollute the earth. In all, Bliss is Ignorance has now lost most of its
social value in depicting hope for the future for a majority of Idyllic Isle’s citizens, as
they believe that future has now arrived and there is no need to dwell on the past.
However, on the opposite side, plenty of Idyllic Isle’s citizens believe—as does the mayor
they elected—that history is an integral part of any city, and therefore it is imperative
that all public art remains that reminds Idyllic Isle of where it came from and how
advanced it is now. Suffice it to say, the majority of the public and the government are at
odds.
The artist of Bliss is Ignorance, still alive, is in the latter years of his life and is
happy to see that the city has improved as he dreamed it would nearly fifty years ago.
However, he is deeply dismayed, not at the tumult of public opinion regarding his
statue—as he believes all art should spark inspiration and debate—but by the amount of
vigilante public art now crowding around his statue. Other local artists have started
putting their own sculptures around Bliss is Ignorance, some of them designed to
purposefully comment on its themes. One sculpture is a solid concrete wall, placed in
front of the scene with the woman extending her arm, intending to suggest that minority
women will always be kept out of influential positions. Another sculpture depicts a dog
lifting its hind leg on the corner of Bliss is Ignorance, evoking a Dadaistic ethos of
everything being nonsensical and meaningless, art included. The artist of Bliss is
Ignorance believes he has no recourse to stop this proliferation of secondary works, as
the current mayor is adamant about fostering the creation of public art of all kinds. In
fact, the mayor has publicly stated that he intends to keep all the statues surrounding the
work where they are. Due to this, the artist decides that Bliss is Ignorance no longer
serves his artistic vision; instead, he believes it is being corrupted by other artists’
sculptural commentaries that take away from his message of hope blossoming out of past
strife.
What is Idyllic Isle to do about Bliss is Ignorance? The city’s most powerful
government official—the mayor—wants the work to remain. The public is at odds: the
current majority faction is advocating for its removal, while the former preservationist
faction that elected the mayor wants it to stay. The artist wants to remove the piece
because he does not believe it is serving its purpose any longer. Which of these parties’

38

Vol. 14:1]

Maliha Ikram

views should control what ultimately happens to the art? And what factors inform that
outcome?
INTRODUCTION: CULTURAL HERITAGE2—WHAT IT MEANS AND FOR WHOM IT HOLDS
MEANING
Cultural heritage comprises the shared ideologies, experiences, and values
communities use to build their cultural identity.3 Cultural heritage develops over time,
and is comprised of the values of a people and place through cultural signifiers. This
heritage can be developed through art,4 landmarks, community projects, parks, and so
forth. But what is so unique about public art5 is that, as it lasts on the land, it can achieve
relevant cultural status based on its “history, popularity, or fame . . . .”6 Neighboring
individuals or passersby can derive emotional fulfillment from the work and may begin to
see it as part of their identity as residents of the locality where it sits. Still, when it comes
to preventing destruction of the public art—despite it having achieved “cultural heritage”
status, the public is unable to lean on “moral rights” legislation like the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)7 located in the Copyright Act of 19768 to prevent
adulteration of the work.9 Only the artist of the public art has this prerogative.10
Notwithstanding the public’s lack of legal recourse, the preservation of art that is
“symbolic of a culture, community, or society” may be squarely in the public interest
such that any other governmental interest for the land on which it sits may pale in
comparison to the cultural heritage the work represents.11 This view is of course one that
places the interests of the public above those of the artist (who may want to remove or
alter the work for personal reasons) and the government (who may want to use the land
for another purpose or otherwise remove the art for economic or aesthetic reasons) in the
name of shared cultural heritage.12 But prioritizing the interests of the public may have
complications, especially when one thinks of artists as the masters of their work or the
2

Cultural heritage comprises the shared ideologies, experiences, and values that communities use to build
their cultural identity. See Cathay Y. N. Smith, Community Rights to Public Art, 90 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 369,
381 (2016).
3
Id.
4
See Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural Property: Toward a National
Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 179 (2001) (“[T]here is an identifiable public
or community-centered interest in certain objects.”).
5
For the purpose of this Article, “public art” means art that is displayed in public spaces and on public
lands where it is accessible to everyone.
6
Smith, supra note 2, at 369–70.
7
See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (providing a federal legal scheme that
protects the artist and his or her “moral rights”—a colloquial term for the rights explicitly listed in the
statute—in the artwork); see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that moral rights are those of attribution and integrity).
8
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012).
9
Smith, supra note 2, at 370–71.
10
See infra Part II-C.
11
Smith, supra note 2, at 378–79.
12
In her article, Cathay Y. N. Smith also includes—and emphasizes—the private property owner whose
property contains public art. For purposes of this Article, the private property owner is not included in the
“public art” analysis.
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government as shaping a locality’s heritage over time. This begs the question—whose
cultural heritage interest governs?
That the public has a common right to preserve cultural heritage is a novel idea,13
albeit a noteworthy one in the sense of fostering community identity. Sometimes, a
locality views its public art as being essential to the land; public artworks such as
Chicago’s Cloud Gate (nicknamed “The Bean” by local residents) or New York City’s
Statue of Liberty are particularly famous examples. To remove such works would be an
affront to the citizens of those cities’ shared identity, as these cultural works “nourish” in
local residents “a sense of community, of participation in a common human enterprise.”14
In examples such as these, where a community ascribes significance to public art, it
follows that the citizens should have some say in that art’s disposition.15 However, public
art may in fact be commissioned by federal, state, or local governments, and even though
the artwork has particular significance to a community, it is ultimately available to the
public because of the government.
When public art is created for, purchased by, or transferred to the government, the
ends of that art may not be purely for public enjoyment but rather for stimulating the
economy or boosting the locality’s morale.16 Government may have a very tailored end—
to beautify its cities and increase aesthetic quality of life. It is well-documented that
people tend to gravitate towards areas that have “special traits” such as “architectural
beauty” and unique “recreational opportunities.”17 This means that public art, when it has
risen to the level of cultural heritage, can create a sense of “attachment” to a community,
encouraging people to both come and then stay.18 In this sense, the way in which public
art is placed and given cultural significance is a “local matter.”19 In these cases, the
government itself builds a city’s cultural heritage and dictates how that heritage develops
over time. As such, public art’s cultural heritage is not only a product of the public’s
appreciation and conferring of “heritage” status onto the work, but also that of the
government’s orchestration of where that art sits, how visible it is and to whom, and for
how long it remains.20
Indeed, cultural heritage is multifaceted, and the works that achieve that status give
rise to many complications in terms of competing interests. Still, the above debate
discredits the role of the artist in the conversation of the artwork’s place in society. For
scenarios where the living artist retains an interest in his or her public artwork, the public
and government’s interest in its contribution to cultural identity may be insufficient to

13

Smith, supra note 2, at 380.
John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 339, 349 (1989).
15
Smith, supra note 2, at 381.
16
Id.
17
Gerald A. Carlino & Albert Saiz, City Beautiful 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 0822, 2008), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008.
18
Smith, supra note 2, at 381–82.
19
Clifford Geertz, Art As a Cultural System, 91 MLN COMP. LITERATURE 1473, 1475 (1976).
20
This is not to be confused with “time, place, and manner” restrictions, a term of art stemming from First
Amendment jurisprudence. When a government engages in such determinations of time, place, and manner
of speech, that behavior is considered “government speech,” which the Supreme Court concluded was an
acceptable form of regulation in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009).
14
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confer these groups dominion over it under current federal law that makes protecting the
interest of the artist its priority.21
This Article will be informed in equal parts by existing law (through a descriptive
analysis) and my own suggestions (through a normative analysis). I will analyze which
legal frameworks might control the resolution of this question in different circumstances,
followed by an explanation of what should be made of these frameworks in practice. Of
particular importance are circumstances where the law is either silent or inexplicit, in
which case policy decisions must correctly balance the interests of each of the parties to
achieve an outcome in accordance with the overall spirit of the law and the public’s
shared cultural heritage generally. The issues surrounding long-term public art
preservation are multifaceted, and each parties’ position poses relevant social interests.
Ultimately, the challenge in resolving this debate requires balancing each party’s interests
in accordance with the overarching legal schemes, while still acknowledging that the
result should be rooted in cultural heritage concerns. I argue that public art should be held
in the public trust for the people once it has risen to the level of local “significance.”22
Long-term preservation is integral for public art that informs local heritage—but the
converse is also true: art may be removed or altered if the public determines the art is no
longer representative of community identity.
The structure of the Article is as follows. First, I will discuss the relevant parties—
the government, the public, and the artist(s)—and the different legal schemes that govern
them, which are predominantly local government law and copyright law. Second, I will
lay out the relevant copyright schemes that protect the artist(s)’s interest in their public
artwork, namely, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA). Third, I will present the
fair use defense and the Derivative Works Right under copyright law as a way for the
public to push back against artist(s)’s copyright claims under VARA. Fourth, I will
explore the government and the public’s unique relationship to each other under property
law’s public trust doctrine, through which the government is legally required to hold
lands—and, as I argue, public art—in the public trust for the community’s enjoyment.
Fifth, I will address the hotly-debated issue of Confederate monument removal, arguing
that such monuments’ preservation, adaptation, or removal is inherently a cultural
heritage issue. Finally, I suggest various approaches for resolving the unrest between
governments and their electorate.
I. THE PLAYERS AND THE GAME
Long-term maintenance of public art presents a substantive conflict of interests
between various players—most saliently the elected government officials, the public,23
21

See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012) (addressing the rights of the author of the work, colloquially known as
“moral” rights).
22
Smith, supra note 2, at 381.
23
When I say the “public,” as distinct from the “government,” what I mean is that there must be
recognition of the shifts in controlling majority factions within the public that may come into tension with a
“government” official who was elected when a certain faction was the majority but who does not remain
the representative of choice for the public when the majority faction changes. Additionally, aside from the
tyranny of vacillating factions, there are infrastructural problems that prevent autonomy in a community’s
ability to elect officials. One such example of this is politically preservationist gerrymandering. See Walter
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and the artist(s). When art is created or installed on public lands, each of these groups is
implicated. Conflicts arise between these groups when their viewpoints regarding the
value of the art diverge, leading to clashing opinions as to how to handle the preservation,
adaptation, or removal of public art. This Article will evaluate how and whether public
art should be preserved in the long-term by discussing both the merits and faults of the
positions held by interested parties—the government, the public, and artist(s)—and
ultimately determining whose opinion might control in different scenarios.
A.

The Government

The term “government,” for purposes of this Article, is local government,24
consisting of majority-elected public officials. In theory, the platform upon which a
candidate for public office runs for election reflects the values of various factions within
the local electorate. In the end, whichever view the majority of citizens ascribes to wins
the day, and the candidate who best represents that majority view is elected to office.
With this position, the government official enjoys a term that typically lasts several years.
This is a general phenomenon of representative government. During this time, the official
may decide to either continue to hold the views on which he or she ran, or adapt them to
cultivate a broader reach. Historically, the former happens,25 whereby the official sticks
to party lines and the political mood of the majority that elected him or her. Because of
this, the “government” may not be in tune with shifts in support. The majority that
elected the current makeup of officials can change, and with that comes ideological
conflict between the government actor and the citizens.26
M. Frank, Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case Against Gerrymandering to Protect Congressional
Incumbents, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 227 (2006) (“Walt Whitman loved elections with their torchlight
parades, unending campaign oratory and passionate divisions. For him, the most powerful scene in the
western world was the still small vibrating voice—America's choosing day. Had he been told that
America's real choosing days now occur long before the voters go to the polls, he would undoubtedly have
disapproved. But, at least with respect to the House of Representatives, that is precisely the case. Today,
most elections for Congress have all the suspense of a driver's license renewal and all the excitement of a
trip to the mall.”) (internal quotations omitted).
24
In thinking about local governments, it is important to note that they can comprise both city or locality
and state governments. For purposes of this Article, the choice of whether to remove or maintain public art
rests at the local level within the state. This, of course, is further nuanced by the state’s grants of authority,
which may or may not confer home rule advantage for localities via an enabling act from the state. Thus,
“home rule states,” as they are called, create powers for localities, be they initiative or immunity powers.
Still, local governments are often subject to preemption from state legislatures—or perhaps do not even
have home rule at all—further complicating the relationship between the government and the voters. See
Joseph Zelasko, The Reverse-Commandeering System: A Better Way to Distribute State and Local
Authority, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 83, 90 (2017) (“Today, however, very few home rule provisions provide
local governments with immunity from legislative interference in local affairs—generally, ordinances
passed under a local government's home rule authority can be preempted by state legislation.”).
25
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 923 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“At the same
time that incumbents enjoy the electoral advantages that they have conferred upon themselves, they also
enjoy astonishingly high reelection rates.”); see also Patrick T. Roath, The Abuse of Incumbency on Trial:
Limits on Legalizing Politics, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 285, 298 (2014) (suggesting that incumbency
inherently brings advantages to government officials’ ability to engage with their constituents and secure
reelection, and the line between abuse of incumbency and legitimate use of incumbency is often blurry).
26
Ryan Struyk, Even Republicans Don’t Like Congress Anymore, CNN (Aug. 3, 2017, 5:24 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/republicans-congress-approval-drops/index.html.
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Factions

Factions, or interest groups, are created when groups of citizens ascribe to disparate
goals for the locality. When a faction gains enough momentum to become the largest—
majority—faction, the longstanding Madisonian impetus is to ensure that majority rule
does not rise to the level of tyranny.27 The concern is that the majority faction will
become self-serving, striving to “subordinate the common good” to its own interests.28
And indeed, the majority often does accomplish this; it is why at the most basic political
level, people ascribe to a blanket “red” or “blue” political identity, even if doing so may
be counter-productive to the general interests of the collective citizenry.29 However,
factions do win elections—at the end of the day, the candidate that corrals the majority
gets to hold office for the term. This means that term duration can create a lag in the
current of political change, as the majority group at the time of election may no longer be
the majority group before the expiration of the official’s term. Thus, if a government
official takes a stance on an issue facing the locality—such as public art preservation—
his or her policy position may not align with the shift in public opinion a few years down
the road as to whether to preserve or remove art.
Another potential problem posed by representative governments is when the
electorate or a candidate does not give a specific issue priority in the election. In many
instances, elections may come down to single-issue politics, in which the outcome of the
election hinges on a single issue carrying disproportionately significant influence on the
locality.30 In those scenarios, subjectively less pressing issues—long-term art
preservation, perhaps—fall to the wayside. Additionally, some elected officials
themselves may advocate against their prioritization.31 In all, accountability fails because
of how elected officials view certain issues, be they superficial priorities or systemic
problems with deep roots. It comes down to who the majority faction elects.32
27

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (suggesting that one majority faction continually
outnumbering smaller factions is a threat to democracy, as opportunities for that majority to oppress will be
more frequent.).
28
Norman R. Williams II, Rising Above Factionalism: A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review, 69 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 963, 963 (1994).
29
See MORRIS P. FIORINA, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA, 1–8 (3d ed. 2010)
(suggesting that though most of America is not in fact polarized in political ideologies, since media and
socialization falsely portray this to be the case, Americans buy into the manufactured notion of “red” and
“blue”).
30
Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1734
(2013).
31
See Ned Oliver & Mark Robinson, Richmond Councilman Proposes Measure to Advance Confederate
Statue Removal; Colleagues Skeptical, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Sept. 25, 2017),
http://www.richmond.com/news/local/city-of-richmond/richmond-coun...val-colleagues/article_6eec6c7e7609-5c99-849b-4f1aefaef1b1.html (quoting Richmond City Council President Chris Hilbert on monument
removal: “It’s just not a priority for me, and I wish all of the time and energy and resources being put into
this debate would be focused on education and public safety.”).
32
There are, of course, instances where majority rule cannot stand, such as when individual constitutional
rights are adversely affected. In these cases, minority interests are protected at the expense of insidious
majority motivations. Thus, purely “local” majority actions become subservient to the larger governing
entity. This is due to the recognition that there are social goals involving constitutionally protected rights
that are bigger than the locality’s majority-made decisions. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 442 (N.J. 1983) (Where minority citizens wanted suitable housing but the
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State Constitutions

State constitutions vary in what constitutes local power—that is, to what degree the
locality has decision-making authority. Professor Gerald Frug argues that it is because
local governments are viewed as inferior political entities to their states, and because
home rule often does not change that, local governments do not win out over their
states.33 This is due to the design of state constitutions; without limitations in their
constitutions, states can “amend, abridge or retract any power it has delegated, much as it
can impose new duties or take away old privileges.”34 This means that the state
constitution dictates what the parameters of power are and how the electoral process—
and what issues can be meaningfully addressed therein—will be affected at the local
level.
Corruption is an extreme in which the electorate may not matter at all due to
government officials looking out for themselves. This can range from ignoring the
electorate altogether or maintaining viewpoints just to pander to the majority to ensure reelection.35 State constitutions may not even play much of a role in these local elections,
as they may be more “hands-off” or otherwise confer home rule advantage to the locality
for the issues at play. When local government officials become so self-interested that
legitimate use of incumbency becomes susceptible to abuse to advance political goals,
corruption may be evident.36 And in this state of corruption, it may be unlikely that the
public is being represented, as the harm it causes “subverts the democratic process to
provide a private good for one individual”—the officeholder—“rather than a public good
for all.”37
3.

Present and Future Interests

Political goals change over time, and old laws may not necessarily account for an
evolving society. However, successfully changing laws and amending constitutions are
not easy feats. Perhaps there is political gridlock; perhaps the existing laws are designed
such that the local government official’s hands are tied.38 Though public opinion may

township made it nearly impossible due to its zoning laws, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said that the
locality could not just look after its own interests and ignore statewide fair-housing initiatives.).
Furthermore, steps are often taken by local governments to mitigate past issues and move forward with
ameliorative remedies, albeit inorganically undertaken. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1283 (Conn.
1996) (“We therefore hold that, textually, article eighth, § 1 [of the Connecticut Constitution], as informed
by article first, § 20, requires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in our
public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure or de facto.”).
33
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: The Structure of Local Government Law (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
6–7 (1990).
34
Id. at 7.
35
For this circumstance, the goal is reelection for the sake of maintaining power, not necessarily to serve
the electorate.
36
See Roath, supra note 25, at 291 (“[T]he threat of incumbent abuse can be understand [sic] as a corollary
to the harm posed by corruption generally.”) (internal quotations omitted).
37
Id. at 293.
38
An example of such a limit on an official’s power is if state law preempts local law on a given issue and
there is no home rule immunity for the locality. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1(a) (2015) (“Except as
otherwise provided in . . . this section, a monument, memorial, or work of art owned by the State may not
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vacillate over time, the constraints of elections prevent the public from effectively
rejecting the views of officeholders while they are in office in their local governments. 39
This may often lead to frustration as “[l]aws and the directives of legal authorities restrict
the ability of citizens to behave as they wish.”40 When there is unrest in the public as to
whether laws are reflecting its interests—and whether governing officials are doing
anything about addressing these interests—it leads to a lack of trust in authority.
Accordingly, dissonance between the people and the government grows.
B.

The Public

Ideally, the relationship of the government and the public is one where the
government reflects the public’s view and thus is in harmony with it. However, the
“public” in this Article is one that is at odds with its elected officials. 41 This is not a
reach, as factions among the voters vacillate in terms of which group is the controlling
majority. The framework, then, is one where a particular majority faction that was
controlling at the time of governmental elections votes in officials that meet its ideologies
and expectations. However, given that these government officials have terms, during the
course of their tenure in office the controlling majority faction may change. When this
happens, the public—or at least a majority of the public—may presently hold a view
distinct from the faction that elected the officials in control. Thus, the “public” takes on a
divergent majority view from the “government.” And this phenomenon is where tension
develops between these two actors when it comes to desired outcomes for the locality’s
cultural identity.
C.

The Artist

The artist’s role in the government/public/artist power struggle over public art is
perhaps the most multifaceted. First, as referenced earlier in this Article, federal legal
schemes protect the artist and his or her “moral rights” in the artwork, namely the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)42 located in the Copyright Act of 1976.43 This
framework affords artists a great deal of protection if they meet the qualifying VARA

be removed, relocated, or altered in any way without the approval of the North Carolina Historical
Commission.”).
39
It is not until they can exercise their right to vote that they can remove the elected government official.
Even then, there is no guarantee that the new officeholder will be able to effectuate change in the local
legislative scheme.
40
Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views About Morality
and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 707, 709 (2000).
41
See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 739 (1986) (arguing that the public and the government can be viewed distinctly under
the Public Trust Doctrine because some property is “inherently public property”: “[T]he public at large,
which despite its unorganized state has property-like rights in the lands held in trust for it—[has] rights that
may be asserted even against its own representatives . . . . On such a theory, even the legislature itself
cannot divest the public of its rights.”).
42
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012); see also Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71
F.3d 77, 81–82 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that moral rights are those of attribution and integrity).
43
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012).
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criteria, which depends on both the stature of the artist and the art in question.44 VARA
provides a lot of protection for the artist: perhaps most saliently, the right to prevent the
use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification that is prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.45
Second, VARA gives an artist the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of that work, and the right to prevent any destruction of a work of
the artist’s which is of recognized stature if such destruction is “intentional or grossly
negligent . . . .”46
Exceptions to this broad sweep are as follows: modification of a work of visual art
which is the result of the passage of time (and is therefore not a distortion, mutilation, or
other modification); the modification of a work of visual art which is the result of
conservation efforts, or presentation of the work to the public (unless such modification is
caused by gross negligence).47 However, these protective rights do not apply to any
secondary reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any
connection with any item defined as a “work of visual art.”48 The artist enjoys these
rights for the duration of his or her life, both for works created on or after the effective
date of VARA and for works created before the effective date of the Act to which the
artist still holds title.49 Under VARA, the artist’s rights may not be transferred, but they
may be waived in a written instrument signed by the author that specifies the work of
visual art at issue and the uses of that work to which the waiver applies.50
Given this backdrop, it becomes clear that an artist’s work of visual art is wellprotected under VARA. However, one wonders how much the artist’s voice matters when
the government or the public has divergent opinions on the work that may not harmonize
with the artist’s own view. The government may very well take a stance on the work that
effectively calls for the violation of VARA by intentional destruction, mutilation, or
modification of the art. The public, too, may petition for its removal or adaptation
because of changing cultural attitudes, as in the case of Confederate monuments erected
in the American South, discussed further in Part V of this Article. It appears obvious that,
under current law, as long as the artist is alive, the artist’s rights over the use of his or her
work should control. But still, this construction is not as straightforward as it appears, as
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “work of visual art” as (1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture,
existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature of other identifying
mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author.); § 106A; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303,
325 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (establishing
the “recognized stature” test as requiring “(1) that the visual art in question has ‘stature,’ i.e., is viewed as
meritorious, and (2) that this stature is ‘recognized’ by art experts, other members of the artistic
community, or by some cross-section of society”) (quoting § 106A(a)(3)(B)).
45
§ 106A(a)(3)(A).
46
§ 106A(a)(3)(B).
47
Id.
48
§ 106A(a).
49
§ 106A(d).
50
§ 106A(e).
44
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the “author”51 of the work may not have the legal standing to defend his or her work
against government control or public pressure after transferring it to the government. The
complications that arise are fundamentally ones of power, and serve to undermine the
idea that an artist has meaningful control over his or her work after it is placed on public
lands.
II. COPYRIGHT LAWSUITS UNDER VARA: THE ARTIST AND THE GOVERNMENT
Traditionally, the legal framework which empowers an artist to reassert dominion
over his or her public art arises in the form of a lawsuit against the government under
VARA. In such cases, the violation of the artist’s moral “rights”52 under VARA is the
contested issue.53 The artist can prevail on a moral rights claim against a party (in these
cases, the government) in the event of intentional54 “distortion, mutilation, or other
modification” of the work of visual art which would be prejudicial to the artist’s
reputation, any destruction of a work of “recognized stature,” and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work.55 If an artist can prove that his or her work of
visual art is of recognized stature and that it has been destroyed, mutilated, or otherwise
modified, it is likely that his or her interest in the work can withstand attacks from the
defendant.56 Indeed, VARA confers significant protection to the artist if he or she meets
the correct burden of proof under the statute.57 As such, VARA suggests that the artist’s
stake in his or her work is perhaps the most explicitly protected legal interest held by all
interested parties concerned with long-term preservation of public art.
A.

General Principles for the Living Artist’s Interest to Prevail

When it comes to the competing interests of the living artist, the public, and the
government regarding public art preservation, policy concerns tip the scale in favor of the
artist.58 Save for arguments as to fair use or transfer of copyright ownership, 59 the artist is
given significant protections under VARA, suggesting that, unless the artist transfers
ownership or waives his or her moral rights to the government or some other entity, the
51

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
§ 106A(a) (2012).
53
See Pollara v. Seymour, 150 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). (Where the artist plaintiff
asserted that her rights were violated under VARA when the mural she painted for a lobbying event was
removed without her permission and torn and damaged in the process).
54
See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1999) (“This appears to be a case of
bureaucratic failure within the City government, not a wilful [sic] violation of plaintiff’s VARA rights.”).
55
§ 106A(a).
56
Martin, 192 F.3d at 614.
57
This burden of proof requires the plaintiff must show that modification, mutilation, distortion, or
destruction of an plaintiff’s work resulted in reputational harm to the plaintiff. However, the First Circuit in
Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foundation, Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 53–54 (1st Cir.
2010) stated that the burden of proof has had various interpretations that have not been sufficiently
analyzed because many cases that go to litigation are often decided on “threshold questions” such as
whether the artist’s work qualifies as a work of “visual art.” The Massachusetts Museum court agreed with
scholar Melville B. Nimmer that artists have to show that the effect of such modifications and destructions
are “prejudicial” to their reputation (i.e., “reputational harm”). Id. at 37-38.
58
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing that “authorship” is heavily prioritized).
59
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
52
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artist’s interest remains salient. This holds true when certain contexts surrounding the
public art merit deference to the living artist who created it. Often, an artist has a
particular vision for the work that can only be met in specific ways. Other times, the
concern is the nature of the work itself60 and what purpose it is supposed to serve and for
how long. Naturally, concerns as to adverse impacts on the locality may arise, and in
those cases, it is worth exploring the path that is truest to the integrity of public art as a
concept.
Temporary61 Nature of the Art

1.

Some artists create their works specifically to serve a purpose for a limited
duration, a snapshot in time. One can imagine a scenario where an artist wishes to
comment on a particular problem facing a locality in which they display his or her art.
This problem may be the construction of a new bridge, and an artist may wish to create a
beautiful sculpture that sits upon public lands facing the bridge to simultaneously
comment on the construction itself and beautify the otherwise sullied construction site.
When construction is complete, the artist may decide the sculpture is now moot as far as
his or her vision for the piece is concerned and seek its removal. It could be that the
general public or the governing officials enjoy the work or have experienced a boom in
tourism for those wishing to see it. However, even in those instances, a living artist’s
vision—so long as he or she has retained his or her right to the work—should reign
supreme. The art is fundamentally temporary in nature, so it is designed to only last for a
certain amount of time. To keep the work in place would undermine the artist’s rhetorical
purpose.
2.

Location-Specific62 Art

A similar scenario arises if the public art is tied to a particular piece of land. In a
case like this, the government may propose to move the art to another public space
(perhaps because there is a better use of the land), but the artist is adamant about the art
only making sense in that specific space. To the artist, the art is essentially worthless if it
is not tied to the specific piece of public land for which it was created. 63 A sculpture of a
nautical ship overlooking the water may not make sense to the artist’s vision if it was
moved to a landlocked area. In these scenarios, the living artist’s rights do matter,64 but
60

Griffin M. Barnett, Recognized Stature: Protecting Street Art as Cultural Property, 12 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 204, 208–09 (2013); see also Pollara v. Seymour, 150 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396 n.4 (N.D.N.Y.
2001) (VARA was effectively invoked by the artist when his work was destroyed by the owner of the
private building to which the artwork was attached. The court found that the artist should have been
consulted before the destruction of his work because the art could have been removed from the defendant’s
property and preserved without destruction. As such, the plaintiff artist retained his moral rights in the
work.).
61
See Smith, supra note 2, at 412–13 (noting that some art is not meant to be permanent).
62
See id. at 410 (suggesting that for some public art that is “site-specific,” the “deliberate incorporation of
the location of the art” is an “integral element of the art”).
63
See Barnett, supra note 60, at 213 (“[A]ny removal of the work from its site would significantly dilute
the artistic meaning and importance of the work.”).
64
The caveat of course is that VARA does not cover site-specific art, likely because it would render the
location inalienable, meaning that any change to the space would necessarily destroy the art in some way if
it truly were part of the fiber of the space. A potential argument can be made in favor of extending VARA
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perhaps the path of least resistance would be that the artist decides that the art belongs
nowhere if not on the public land it was originally placed on. For the artist, the art is
location-specific, and it does not make sense anywhere but its original location. Arturo Di
Modica’s Charging Bull sheds light on this idea: a bull representative of economic
resilience and prosperity will likely fail to carry that message if placed on agrarian public
lands far removed from the economic epicenter of Wall Street.65 The location matters; if
the case is such that the government has no choice but to move the artwork, the artist
should retain the option to remove the artwork from public display altogether in lieu of
relocation.
3.

Revenue Generating Art

The biggest argument against living artists retaining dominant rights over the
public and the government is an economic one.66 If a work of public art garners attention
and stimulates tourism and the local economy, it becomes harder for the artist’s plight to
appear sympathetic. An artist who advocates for his or her work’s removal due to its
temporary intent or location-specific message may face considerable pushback from the
government or the public. Still, as long as the artist retains his or her copyright and moral
rights in the work, he or she may be able to control the destiny of the art despite the
interests of the other two parties.67 Whether or not this is an economically perverse
outcome, it should not factor into the determination that the “author” of the public art
determines its use.68 The living artist’s rights should be respected as to both the
maintenance and desired removal of the public visual art.

to site-specific art, however, but only for outdoor site-specific locations rather than those tied to physical
buildings. See Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We do not
denigrate the value or importance of site-specific art, which unmistakably enriches our culture and the
beauty of our public spaces. We have simply concluded, for all of the reasons stated, that the plain language
of VARA does not protect site-specific art."); Barnett, supra note 60, at 212–13 (Acknowledging the gap
VARA has in failing to extend protection to site-specific art, and suggesting that Congress should address
this oversight.).
65
See infra Part II-C.
66
Barnett, supra note 60, at 214 (“[T]he alteration or destruction of the work could also harm the social and
economic well-being of the community. Removing a beloved mural from a neighborhood harms both its
aesthetics and lowers property values of the entire community.”).
67
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 735 (1989) (Defendant sculptor Reid was
determined to be the exclusive owner of the copyright in the contested sculpture. Thus, he sought to prevent
its use for any purpose that he did not permit. This case illustrates the strength of copyright ownership and
the resultant use of the copyrighted work.); see also Jacey Fortin, Who Owns Art from Guantánamo Bay?
Not Prisoners, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/us/guantanamo-bay-art-exhibit.html?mwrsm=Email (insinuating that
ownership is foreclosed for prisoners who create their art as part of federally provided art classes for the
inmates).
68
Rebecca J. Morton, Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.: A Fair Test of the Visual Artists Rights Act?, 28
CONN. L. REV. 877, 907 (1996) (suggesting that VARA gives the artist the most influence; “[p]ublic
concern for the preservation of any work goes unheeded unless the artist is willing to pursue protection”).
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The Artist Versus the Government: Kelley v. Chicago Park District

Perhaps the most famous recent case of an artist asserting a VARA claim against
the government is Kelley v. Chicago Park District,69 where an artist brought an action
against the City of Chicago, alleging that the city modified his original work and reduced
its size such that his moral rights under VARA were violated.70 While the Kelley case
ultimately hinged on issues of copyright, and whether the piece itself—an elliptical
wildflower display installed in Chicago’s Grant Park—was a “work of visual art” under
VARA, what is implicit in this case is whose rights govern if the plaintiff can or cannot
establish copyrightability. If an artist can meet statutory definitions of whether or not a
work is “visual art,” then, conceivably, the artist gets greater rights under VARA and thus
is more likely to be triumphant in the overarching issue of preservation of his or her
public art. Thus, the case ultimately hinged on whether or not the work itself was a “work
of visual art” under VARA. The analysis, however, is valuable for artists seeking relief
under VARA, as many artists may not fail on the technicality of whether their work is or
is not “visual art.”71
The artist, Chapman Kelley, was nationally recognized and was known for his
paintings of landscapes and flowers.72 He received permission in 1984 from the Chicago
Park District73 to install a wildflower display in Grant Park, a public space in Chicago.74
He called the installation Wildflower Works, and it was planted in the public space.75 The
work was extremely popular and was maintained by volunteers for years.76 However,
over time, Wildflower Works began to deteriorate77 and the City of Chicago had a
different vision for Grant Park.78 The government and the artist had opposing views on
the value of the artwork. Kelley had originally been drawn to Grant Park, Chicago
because of his artistic vision of engaging with the environment, educating others, and
reaching the masses through art.79 As his work fell into disrepair, however, it hampered
his vision and no longer portrayed his artistic sensibilities80 to his satisfaction. Thus,
Kelley sued the Chicago Park District under VARA on the ground that his “right of
69

Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 295.
71
A statue, painting, or other “fixed” medium is more likely to prevail as a “work of visual art” under
VARA. In Kelley, the plaintiff created an organic, vegetative garden with sculptural properties, but it was
found to be insufficiently “fixed” to support a copyright or a finding of “moral rights” under VARA. Id. at
306.
72
Id. at 291.
73
The Chicago Park District is a government body that is best described as a creature of the state primarily
because it is not funded by the city of Chicago and acts independently from the city of Chicago.
74
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 294 (Providing background prior to Kelley’s lawsuit, stating that the Chicago Park District and
Kelley had argued for decades over issues like city permitting, whether to transfer maintenance of the
garden to a nonprofit at no cost to the government, and whether maintenance of the garden was feasible in
the face of new construction for the adjacent Millennium Park).
78
Id. at 291.
79
Id. at 292.
80
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.01[A] (2018); 5 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §§ 16:1, 16:3 (2018).
70
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integrity” as an artist was violated due to the deterioration of Wildflower Works.81 Kelley
claimed that he had the right to prevent the distortion or modification of his work during
his lifetime that would be “prejudicial” to his honor or reputation.82 The Seventh Circuit,
however, ultimately held that VARA did not apply to Kelley’s piece because his
underlying public art was not itself copyrightable.83 This was due to its status as a living,
vegetative garden, which the judge determined lacked the “fixation” necessary for a valid
copyright claim.84 Although there was no question that Wildflower Works attained
“recognized stature”85 under VARA, it was merely a technical difficulty that the public
art was fundamentally a garden86—at least in the eyes of the court—and, thus, Kelley
could not establish the very copyright foundation upon which VARA builds.87
Even though Kelley did not result in a favorable outcome for the plaintiff artist,
the case outlines the strong interests that an artist has in his or her public art. The caveat,
of course, is that the work must at least be copyrightable—in this case, the fact that
Kelley’s work was a garden led to his loss. However, if Kelley’s Wildflower Works was
instead a bronze statue, it is much more likely that he would have prevailed against the
government, as his moral right interests under VARA would have had the copyrighted
ground to stand on. Even though the nature of Kelley’s work ultimately undermined his
VARA claim, Kelley presents a strong showing of the importance of moral rights for the
artist of a copyrightable work of recognized stature.88
C.

The Charging Bull and the Fearless Girl: A Case Study

Charging Bull, fondly regarded as a staple of New York City’s financial district,
has recently garnered national attention. Arturo Di Modica, an Italian immigrant sculptor,
created the bull in 1989.89 Though he took an unconventional route in placing his public
art—he managed to “plop[] the 3 1/2-ton bovine beneath a Christmas tree in front of the
New York Stock Exchange in December of 1989 without a permit”—it was eventually

81

Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291.
Id. at 292.
83
For VARA to apply, the “work of visual art” must be copyrightable. Id. at 295. Kelley tried to argue that
his work was both a painting and a sculpture, but this argument failed on appeal. Id. at 301.
84
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.).; Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303–04 (“[A] living garden lacks the kind of authorship and
stable fixation normally required to support copyright . . . . Simply put, gardens are planted and cultivated,
not authored.”).
85
See Kelley, 635 F.3d at 293 (“Wildflower Works was greeted with widespread acclaim. Chicago’s
mayor, the Illinois Senate, and the Illinois Chapter of the American Society of Landscape Artists issued
commendations.”).
86
See id. at 301 (“VARA plainly uses the terms ‘painting’ and ‘sculpture’ as words of limitation . . . . [But,]
if a living garden like Wildflower Works really counts as both a painting and a sculpture, then these terms
do no limiting work at all.”) (emphasis in original).
87
See id. at 299 (“ . . . VARA supplements general copyright protection; to qualify for moral rights under
VARA, a work must first satisfy basic copyright standards.”).
88
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2012).
89
New York Post Editorial Board, Charging Bull Has Earned Its Spot, NEW YORK POST (Feb. 14, 2018,
10:46 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/02/14/charging-bull-has-earned-its-spot/.
82

51

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2018

accepted as a mainstay of the neighborhood.90 Di Modica’s message in relation to the
bull’s presence was simple: it was to boost the spirits of American traders after the stock
market crash in the years preceding 1989.91 Di Modica stated that he intended the bull
sculpture to be a symbol of “prosperity” and “strength,” one that would serve as a
reminder of resilience for years to come.92
However, eventually, a new statue stepped into the ring. This statue, titled Fearless
Girl, was sculpted by Kristen Visbal, and was installed facing Charging Bull head on.
Fearless Girl was in fact commissioned by State Street Global Advisors, a firm that
wanted a statue to “call attention to a lack of women leaders on Wall Street . . . .”93
Though the statue of the girl appears to serve a noble purpose and has drawn “countless
tourists, a metric ton of media coverage and its share of praise as a symbol of the fight for
gender equity,” it has earned the ire of one very interested party: Di Modica. Di Modica
stated that he worries about the negative and disruptive effect he believes Fearless Girl
has had on Charging Bull—going so far as to evoke the presence of the statue as a
violation of his moral rights as an artist.94 Meanwhile, the public and the government
appear to have interests largely oppositional to Di Modica’s—to maintain Fearless Girl
and continue to allow her to implicate Charging Bull to serve the rhetorical purpose of
gender equality.95 The Charging Bull–Fearless Girl story is a modern example of the
rights of the artist, the opinions of the public, and the stance of local government
diverging to a point of seemingly irreconcilable interests.
1.

The Artist Versus Both the Government and the Public

The question of what happens when the artist no longer sees his or her artwork as
serving its intended purpose and wants the art removed even if the public and/or
government wishes to keep it there is one that is at the forefront of the Charging Bull
Fearless Girl debate. It is clear to Di Modica that his bull and Fearless Girl are
unwelcome bedfellows. What is remarkable about Fearless Girl is that it seems to be
designed with Charging Bull in mind, manipulating the fact that the bull already exists to
push the agenda of the firm that commissioned it.96 In this way, the tension is not only in
regards to the sculptures themselves, but the way in which the artist gets to control the
90

Colin Dwyer, Sculptor of Wall Street Bull Says 'Fearless Girl' Horns in on His Work, NPR (Apr. 12,
2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/12/523592057/sculptor-of-wall-streetbull-says-fearless-girl-horns-in-on-his-work; see also id. (noting that the New York Stock Exchange was
not happy with the “gift” and removed the bull later that day; however, Charging Bull was eventually
moved south of Wall Street, where it still stands).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Sarah Cascone, Is ‘Fearless Girl’ Actually a Bully? ‘Charging Bull’ Defender Decries Lass as Corporate
Vandalism, ARTNET NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/exhibitions/fearless-bull-charging-girlcopyright-907208; see also James Barron, Wounded by ‘Fearless Girl,’ Creator of ‘Charging Bull’ Wants
Her to Move, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/nyregion/charging-bullsculpture-wall-street-fearless-girl.html.
95
Barron, supra note 94.
96
Id. (suggesting that the agenda was to use Charging Bull as a pawn to assert the message of a dearth of
female representation and power in corporate America, thus wrongly likening the bull to an enemy of
women’s advancement that it was never intended to be).
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message relayed by them. What appears to have been willfully disregarded in this case,
however, is Di Modica’s interest in having his bull maintain the rhetorical purpose he
intended for it. Di Modica insists that Fearless Girl is “not a symbol” and that it is a mere
“advertising trick” that is distorting his artwork’s message to drive its own.97 Di Modica
suggests that Fearless Girl’s message has overtaken his, stating that “[t]he girl is standing
there like this in front the bull, saying, ‘Now, what are you going to do?’ ”98 And because
of this messaging, Fearless Girl may create the false impression that the bull is there to
represent an intimidating, formidable force of male-orchestrated female oppression. Di
Modica says that his Charging Bull has been distorted into a villain for the financial gain
of State Street Global Advisors, given that the firm is responsible for abusing it as the
unwelcome counterparty to their commissioned Fearless Girl.99 Because of Di Modica’s
strong interest in maintaining the integrity of his statue, he wants a specific measure to be
taken by the government to remedy this situation—removal of Fearless Girl.100 The
trouble with an artist’s demand for affirmative “removal” of his or her work outright,
however, is that it is not apparent that VARA addresses this situation, as it does for
blocking removal of an artist’s work.101 This shortcoming in VARA works against the
protection for artists established elsewhere in the statute, as it does not give credence to
the reality that erecting a new work of art that functionally “distorts or mutilates” the
meaning of an existing work of art may be just as egregious to the original artist as
defacing the work itself. For this reason, it is unclear how strong a claim Di Modica has
under VARA for the removal of Fearless Girl.
The government, however, has a different vision as to how to treat Fearless Girl.
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio has made it very clear that he has no intention of
removing Fearless Girl, tweeting that “[m]en who don’t like women taking up space are
exactly why we need the Fearless Girl.”102 Somewhat ironically, a statement like this
comes off, at best, as misinformed in view of the artistic interests protected by VARA.
The Mayor wrongly focuses only on Fearless Girl and the message she is trying to
promote: gender equality. There is nothing wrong with this message in itself; what may
be problematic under VARA, however, is Fearless Girl’s use of Charging Bull as a pawn
in that message. Indeed, Di Modica and his attorney agree in part with de Blasio’s
perspective: they too “support the fight for gender equality and . . . do not want the
Fearless Girl banned entirely.”103 What they do want, however, is for Fearless Girl to be
removed from the area where Charging Bull sits because it is adulterating Di Modica’s
message of resilience and turning it into anti-female empowerment propaganda for
Fearless Girl to capitalize on.104
97

Dwyer, supra note 90.
Id.
99
See id. (reporting that Di Modica believes that the commission distorts the intent of his statue into a
villain for the firm’s own gain).
100
Barron, supra note 94.
101
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (failing to mention anything about an artist’s rights extending to removing
another artist’s work of visual art as a means to defend the meaning of his or her own work).
102
Dwyer, supra note 90.
103
Id.
104
See New York Post Editorial Board, Don’t Make the Bull Follow the Girl, NEW YORK POST (Apr. 20,
2018, 8:33 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/04/20/dont-make-the-bull-follow-the-girl/ (stating that, in
98
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The government appears so indifferent to Di Modica’s interest in preventing his
work from being maligned that the city renewed Fearless Girl’s temporary permit
through 2018.105 What’s more telling—perhaps tragically so—is that the community,
including Fearless Girl sculptor Kristen Visbal, does not seem to fully appreciate Di
Modica’s statutory “moral rights” under VARA. In response to Di Modica’s dismay at
the presence of Fearless Girl, Visbal stated, “The world changes and we are now running
with this bull.”106 One would expect Visbal, herself an artist, to appreciate artistic
integrity107 and the importance of an artist’s work to retain its intended meaning.
However, she too appears to hold a diverging, ultimately self-serving interest in misusing
the bull for her own sculpture’s gain. She has no intention of removing Fearless Girl.
Here, the various interests exceed those of the government, the artist(s), and the public;
but irrespective of the multitude of interested parties, few seem motivated by preserving
the integrity of Charging Bull. Who does intend to fight for Fearless Girl’s removal is Di
Modica.
Though it is a convoluted case, this much is clear from the burgeoning saga of the
bronze odd couple: Di Modica has a strong argument for pursuing a lawsuit under
VARA. Di Modica’s attorney stressed that while a lawsuit has not been pursued yet, there
are “issues of copyright” that “needed to be—and still need to be—addressed.”108 Di
Modica and his attorney also have remedial suggestions—removing Fearless Girl and
placing the statue elsewhere in New York City is one of them.109 Additionally, an award
of damages to Di Modica is a possible outcome, assuming his claims of having his legal
rights violated are proven. Still, a VARA claim as to his right of integrity110 may be Di
Modica’s best bet. Since a scheme of legal protection relevant to the artist’s interest in his
or her art is codified under VARA, what matters is how to apply it to Di Modica with
regard to Charging Bull. It is unclear whether Di Modica would be willing to move
Charging Bull elsewhere, though under VARA, he may have the right to do so if his
“integrity” is being compromised by the presence of Fearless Girl. Moreover, Di Modica
may be able to make a colorable claim that his bull is being intentionally “distorted” or
otherwise “modified” by Fearless Girl’s deliberately close placement and that this act of
placement is prejudicial to his reputation.111 On its face, Di Modica’s allegations of
“distorted” messaging of his work due to Fearless Girl’s manipulative presence align
neatly with VARA’s scope. And certainly, the intentionality threshold underlying both
Visbal and the government’s actions is met.
insisting that Fearless Girl remain, Mayor de Blasio has no “right to hijack an artist’s intention and distort
his work’s actual intent to send an entirely contradictory message”).
105
Dwyer, supra note 90.
106
Id.
107
Id. What makes Visbal’s statement even more jarring is that she has publicly admired Charging Bull,
telling the New York Post that the bull is “beautiful” and a “stunning piece of art.”
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2012) (DiModica’s claim is colorable under the right of integrity hook of
the statute, as his work has suffered intentional distortion and mutilation that has in fact been prejudicial to
him, since Charging Bull has been willfully distorted by Fearless Girl so as to appear a threat to female
advancement despite its actual message of hope.).
111
Id.
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2.

Fearless Girl’s Bite: Recognized Stature and Fair Use

The trouble with Di Modica’s desire to see Charging Bull stand independent again
is that Fearless Girl itself is now a statue of “recognized stature” that likely will have its
own VARA protections for Visbal. What is unique is that Fearless Girl’s “recognized
stature” is itself achieved by Charging Bull’s existing presence. In some ways, this
evokes a sort of irony in that Fearless Girl somehow cannot stand on her own two feet
and have the meaning she wishes to disseminate in her message to the public without the
presence of the bull. After all, it is unlikely that Fearless Girl would have attained the
attention she did if it were not for the public’s assumption that Charging Bull contained
an implicit statement about gender equality.112 If Charging Bull were removed, Fearless
Girl may make very little sense or the work’s impact would be significantly hampered—
or even destroyed. For these reasons, and in my opinion,113 it seems that Di Modica has
the stronger claim of the two artists when it comes to maintenance and reputational harm
under VARA.
However, where Fearless Girl may pose a bigger deterrent to Di Modica’s
triumph on his copyright claims is if Visbal counters with a “Fair Use” Defense.114 The
Fair Use Defense is an affirmative defense that an alleged copyright infringer invokes
when sued by the copyright holder. Courts have clarified that finding fair use of the
original work does not mean that infringement is not taking place, but rather, that this
infringement is permissible assuming it passes the four-pronged fair use test.115 Under 17
U.S.C. § 107, the four factors that are considered for determining fair use are applied
variably on a case-by-case basis: none are essential alone or together, and courts may
weigh them differently. These factors are: (1) [T]he purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 116 As a whole, courts will
analyze what effect the infringing work has on the original work based on the fair use
factors. If the court finds that the original work is or would be too adversely affected

112

Dwyer, supra note 90.
There is a dearth of actual case law on the matter of a new work deriving stature by relation to an
existing work of art to meet this VARA requirement.
114
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[F]air use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism [and]
comment
. . . is not an infringement of copyright.” Four factors are considered for determining fair use on a case-bycase basis: “(1) [T]he purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”).
115
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–75 (1994) (“It is uncontested here that 2
Live Crew's song would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose's rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ under the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 but for a finding of fair use through parody. From the infancy of
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to
fulfill copyright's very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’ ”) (internal
citation omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8).
116
§ 107.
113
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(market harm)117 by the infringing work, or that the infringing work is not sufficiently
transforming the work or appropriates too much of it (purpose and character), then fair
use will not be accepted as an affirmative defense.118
Given her statue’s subject matter, placement, and purpose, Visbal may be able to
prove that Fearless Girl is meant to comment on Charging Bull and thus serves
essentially as a criticism of the latter piece that is fundamentally transformative of the
original sculpture as a matter of law under 17 U.S.C. § 107.119 Furthermore, the 17
U.S.C. § 107 the Fair Use Defense explicitly applies to VARA claims under 17 U.S.C. §
106A.120 What may undermine the “transformative” fair use factor, however, is that
Fearless Girl does not physically take from Charging Bull and transform it into
something else.121 Instead, Fearless Girl is more of a commentary on Charging Bull,
seeking to both undermine Charging Bull’s message and to give itself meaning through
its proximity and position in relation to the bull. Again, this case appears to be a novel
one, in which the relational nature of Fearless Girl to Charging Bull is the problem. It is
unclear what courts would think or whether VARA’s framework would be enough to
encompass this unique situation. Visbal’s best bet is likely a fair use defense to Di
Modica’s VARA claims, but even then it is unclear whether her own work can withstand
a challenge to recognized stature if she were to bring her own VARA claim.
Even still, in cases such as this one—where the original artist is still alive—both
the federal statutory scheme under the Copyright Act and general principles of fairness
seem to support the artist as having the ultimate say over what happens to his or her work
of public art. As long as the artist is still a living party whose moral rights under VARA
have been neither transferred nor waived, copyright law would seem to favor his or her
interests.122 Of course, the Charging Bull–Fearless Girl case is complicated by the fact
that Fearless Girl, too, is a work of visual art of seemingly recognized stature, or perhaps
is a transformative commentary strong enough to be considered fair use. Despite this, if
the case makes it to court, Di Modica should win in the ring.123
117

Though courts place different weight on the § 107 factors, resultant harm to the market of a copyright
holder’s work is often considered the most important factor to be considered in whether to accept an
infringer’s fair use defense. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (suggesting that the release of
a film harmed Abend’s ability to market new versions of his story, and that this market harm was the most
important factor in finding infringement of his copyright).
118
See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992) (In describing Koons’s level of appropriation for
fair use purposes, the court said, “Here, the essence of Rogers' photograph was copied nearly in toto, much
more than would have been necessary even if the sculpture had been a parody of plaintiff's work. In short, it
is not really the parody flag that appellants are sailing under, but rather the flag of piracy.”).
119
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710–11 (2d Cir. 2013) (articulating that, when works are sufficiently
transformative in nature, they are fair use as a matter of law).
120
§ 107.
121
See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 711. Fearless Girl is unlike Prince’s collages, which incorporate copies of other
artists’ photographs.
122
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(3) (2012) Di Modica should be able to prevent the intentional distortion of his
work, as the distortion has been prejudicial to his reputation. Furthermore, Charging Bull has attained
recognized stature: it has been on Wall Street for over thirty years and is widely visited by tourists.
123
On the heels of publication, new developments arose in the Fearless Girl and Charging Bull story.
There is now discussion of moving Fearless Girl from Wall Street to a new location—albeit a temporary
one. Fearless Girl is slated to be moved to Ireland from November 6–8, 2018—for the country’s first
“Climate Week”—and will then return to Wall Street. Sarah Cascone, Wall Street’s ‘Fearless Girl’ Is
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III. THE DILEMMA WITH DERIVATIVE WORKS: THE PUBLIC VERSUS THE ARTIST
Public art has the potential to become so influential that the community begins to
see it as a source of inspiration and creativity. To that end, the general public (rather than
established artists) may wish to create independent works of art which either pay homage
to or build upon124 public art that already exists. But these secondary creations may
infringe on the artist’s right125 to control derivative works—new works that are based on
his or her original creation.126 Thus, the artist and the public may have competing
interests in the use and purpose of public art. Traditionally, if a work is “fixed”127 on or
after January 1, 1978, then the author automatically has a copyright in it for the duration
of the author’s life plus 70 years.128 In this way, the protections of copyright law are
“artist-centered,” and even if the created work may have cultural value, if made
accessible to the public, nothing prevents the artist from disposing of it.129 Furthermore,
individual copyright protection limits the scope of how and by whom a work may be
used—this includes a limitation on public use.130 Among these limitations is the ability to

Heading to Ireland to Fight Climate Change, ARTNET NEWS: ART WORLD (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/fearless-girl-ireland-climate-change-summit-1362517. Additionally,
Mayor de Blasio decided that Fearless Girl would become a permanent fixture on Wall Street, and that if it
is moved to face the New York Stock Exchange (due to “traffic” concerns at its existing location), it would
be moved along with Charging Bull so that the two would remain together. See J. David Goodman,
‘Fearless Girl’ to Move, and She May Take the Wall Street Bull with Her, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/nyregion/fearless-girl-wall-street-bull-statue-move.html. Notably,
this is a unilateral decision by Mayor de Blasio in contravention of Di Modica’s rights. De Blasio’s press
secretary said, “The mayor felt it was important that the ‘Fearless Girl’ be in a position to stand up to the
bull . . . . That’s why we’re aiming to keep them together.” Id. This decision makes the argument for Di
Modica’s VARA claims even stronger and highlights the danger of government officials’ ability to override
a living artist’s rights. The artist’s unrest continues.
124
See Smith, supra note 2, at 369, 372 (discussing the coming-together of graffiti artists to adorn the mural
known as 5 Pointz, formerly located in Long Island); see also Benjamin Sutton, Graffiti Artists Sue 5Pointz
Developer for Whitewashing Their Murals, HYPERALLERGIC (June 15, 2015),
https://hyperallergic.com/214616/graffiti-artists-sue-5pointz-developer-for-whitewashing-their-murals/
(noting that the artists were unable to prevail on their VARA claims because the art was on private
property, and the bundle of rights that come with private ownership tipped the balance in favor of the
warehouse owner).
125
Assuming the living artist is also the copyright owner.
126
17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘derivative
work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting
of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’ ”).
127
See § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work
consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a
fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.”).
128
How Long Does Copyright Protection Last?, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faqduration.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
129
Wilkes, supra note 4, at 193.
130
Id.
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create derivative works, which can include an array of artistic creations stemming from
the original copyrighted art.131
The authorial check that is placed on a copyrighted work has drawn criticism from
proponents of preservation and cultural heritage, given that copyright ownership
potentially forecloses access to works.132 This creates a strange incentive system. On the
one hand, proponents of art—like museums or curators—value artists and wish to pay
respect to them for their contribution to the broader culture. Simultaneously, these same
individuals remain wary of the copyright protection given to artists because it constrains
what they can do with an artist’s work.133 Thus, there is a bitter irony to individuals in
cultural fields resenting strong copyright ownership for the author under the present
copyright scheme. Yes, they value the artist and the integrity of the artist’s work, but they
seem to value open access to art that is unencumbered by ownership technicalities even
more.134
A.

The Public Domain and Fair Use Defense

When a work is in the “public domain,” an author is either no longer living or
copyright has lapsed in some way such that the public may use the work as it wishes.
While some things are inherently in the public domain, such as objective historical
facts,135 subjective ideas and expressions complicate the analysis because they are
products of individual creation. If a work is deemed to be in the public domain, in theory,
nothing prevents the public from using it to create their own works or forms of
expression based on the original. This would seem to be an easy case where the public is
asserting its rights over those of the artist. However, there is evidence that even if a work
is in the public domain, an individual136—such as a member of the public, a curator, or a
different artist—still may face creative restrictions depending on who owns the original
work.137
In these instances where a work of art is in the public domain, but is not free for
public use, such individuals may express concern about copyright protection
“impoverishing the public domain” by limiting creative expression.138 Thus, the fair use
defense is viewed as an essential affirmative defense to purported copyright infringement.
It functionally says that while a new work of art may ordinarily violate another’s
copyright, that new work—for which the fair use defense is raised—is worthy of existing
in its own right without fear of infringing copyright laws because it passes the four factor
131

Derivative works are based on preexisting works and thus can constitute translations, movie adaptations
of books, reproduction of art, abridged writings, etc. See § 101
132
See Wilkes, supra note 4, at 193 (“[C]opyright protection could impede certain works from being
publicly displayed or catalogued.”).
133
See id. (“Copyright is of particular concern to museum administrators, and perhaps private collectors,
who want to publish catalogues containing reproductions of works of contemporary art.”).
134
See id. (“[C]opyright could potentially subvert the public interest in access to cultural property.”).
135
See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (establishing that
historical facts or “interpretation” are not protected by copyright and can be “freely used by subsequent
authors”).
136
“Individual” here refers to either a member of the public, a curator, a different artist, a museum, or any
other person or entity wishing to use the original artist’s work in a creative or adaptive way.
137
Sonia K. Katyal, Technoheritage, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1111, 1142–43 (2017).
138
Id. at 1136–37.
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test. Indeed, opponents of stricter copyright protections believe that copyright law as a
scheme “underestimate[s] the importance of the public domain”;139 accordingly, these
individuals advocate for greater creative opportunities under a fair use rationale. Of
course, the fair use defense also has limitations,140 and the public user of the contested art
may not be able to win on a fair use defense. In this way, even this affirmative defense
may not help the public overcome the artist’s exclusive rights in the work.
B.

The Relationship Between the Derivative Works Right and Fair Use

The Derivative Works Right is codified in § 106(2) of the Act and comprises works
based upon one or more preexisting works in a form that may be recast, transformed, or
adapted—“derivative works.”141 Consider as examples a film adaptation of a famous
book, an English translation of an epic poem, or a classical violin recording of a rap
record. There are various tests for assessing whether a derivative work is created—i.e.,
whether it acceptably draws from the original work or expressly infringes the copyright
owner’s exclusive right.142 Derivative works of copyrighted material are covered by §
103(a) of the Copyright Act as part of the subject matter of copyright.143 However,
subsection § 103(b) of the Act articulates that the copyright within the derivative work
only extends to the material that is contributed by the author of the derivative work,
separate from any preexisting material.144 As such, only new contributions created in the
derivative work are copyrightable, not the original material. The Derivative Works Test
has been established by courts as one that contemplates finding the recasting,
transformation, or adaptation of a work into another form while still “representing the
‘original work of authorship.’ ”145 In this process, the test gauges whether the work is
concrete or permanent in form—the work must be “fixed” to even rise to the level of
infringement of the copyright owner’s original work.146 If a work is found to be a
derivative work and was not created by the original author, then there is infringement of
the original author’s Derivative Works Right. However, if a work does not infringe as a
139

Id. at 1138.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (requiring the work to pass a four-factor analysis to count as fair use of
another artist’s work).
141
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “derivative work”).
142
See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998) (establishing
a qualitative–quantitative test for finding substantial similarity between a purported derivative work and the
original); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (establishing
the importance of finding “recast” or “transformed” material from the original work in determining whether
a derivative work has been created).
143
17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012).
144
§ 103(b).
145
Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143 n.9 (“stating
that ‘derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright transform an original work into a new mode
of presentation’ ”); Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1373 (2d Cir.
1993) (“finding a derivative work where a guidebook based on the Twin Peaks television series
‘contain[ed] a substantial amount of material from the teleplays, transformed from one medium to another’
”)).
146
See Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that audiovisual displays
assumed a “concrete or permanent” form and were thus derivative works); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992) (establishing the “concrete or permanent” form
requirement for derivative works).
140
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derivative work, it may still be an infringing work under an ordinary copyright
infringement scheme, such as taking too much of the original work and failing to
constitute fair use of the original.147
Fair use may protect the creator of a would-be derivative work148 even if that work
rises to the level of infringement of the original author’s copyright.149 Here, the § 107
four-factor “fair use” test150 is applied to the would-be derivative work to determine if its
infringement of the original work’s copyright is acceptable. Thus, the would-be
derivative work either passes as being fair use of the original or fails and is considered
infringing without exception. For purposes of this Article, the type of fair use defense
raised as applied to original works of public art would most likely be a subsequent
creator’s appropriation of the earlier art as fair use.151 However, when derivative works
created by lay people in the locality do not meet any of the fair use factors (such as
having a transformative nature or commenting on or parodying the original), a fair use
defense will likely be held invalid and the work will be considered infringing. In those
cases, assuming the secondary work is “fixed” and passes the Derivative Works Test, the
original artist/copyright owner will likely prevail in showing that his or her exclusive
Derivative Works Right was violated.
C.

The Artist as Copyright Owner

The point at which an artist’s work is sufficiently in the public domain or is open to
fair use152 is the subject of much debate.153 One view is that if the author of a work of
fixed public art still retains his or her copyright, the artwork is not in the public domain,
and thus the creation of derivative works is forbidden.154
For example, if a sculptor copyright owner155 places a sculpture in a public space,
the public cannot legally create any derivative works based on the sculpture without the
sculptor’s approval, despite the fact that the sculpture is part of the public landscape. This
exclusive right for the sculpture would bar, for instance, a local tourism business from
creating models or posters of the sculpture and selling them to visitors of the locality.
Furthermore, the derivate works right would thwart a local painter from painting the
See Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (holding that a fan’s “Lexicon” for the Harry Potter series was
not a derivative work infringing J.K. Rowling’s derivative works right, but that the “Lexicon” did infringe
Rowling’s copyright to her series by virtue of ordinary infringement and an unsuccessful fair use defense).
148
Though a work may count as “derivative,” it may be protected under the fair use defense, just as if it
were a non-derivative but otherwise infringing work. See supra Part III-B.
149
See supra Part II.
150
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
151
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 711 (2d Cir. 2013); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir.
2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992). In all three cases, the alleged infringer raising a
fair use defense was not the original artist. Additionally, all three cases involve new works with varying
degrees of appropriation of the original work.
152
See § 107.
153
See PATRY, supra note 80, § 9:73 (“Failure to use the more discerning observer test results in the
plaintiff effectively obtaining copyright over public domain elements,” suggesting that Patry would like a
more rigorous test to determine what should be protected under copyright law.).
154
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (giving the copyright owner the exclusive right to create and authorize
derivative works).
155
See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2012).
147
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sculpture and selling the paintings to passersby. A trickier scenario arises when visitors of
the sculpture take photographs of the work and then disseminate the photos on social
media or otherwise sell them for profit. On its face, it would appear that the sculptorcopyright owner would still retain his or her rights to make models, paint pictures, or take
photographs of his or her work. However, § 113(c) of the Copyright Act provides
protections for photographs, suggesting that copyright does not include photographs of
works if they are made in connection with advertising or commentaries related to the
work.156 Still, while tourism uses may remain intact because of this exception in the
scope of copyright, it does not appear that an individual could merely photograph an
image and sell it as his own creation for pecuniary gain.
Such limits on others are intended to protect the sculptor’s market reach, which
would be inhibited by unauthorized works circulating against his or her will.157 Though
such restrictions may chill the locality’s profitability if it hopes to visit the public art to
take photographs or create related art to sell,158 a derivative works scheme that favors the
artist over the public ultimately coheres with general principles of authorship. The artist,
if living and holding a copyright in his or her public art, determines the use and purpose
of that work, irrespective of the public’s interest. For derivative works then, an artist’s
claim over his or her public art governs, and the public’s use of this art for its own artistic
expression is subservient to the copyright-owning artist’s interests.
As such, the artist’s ability to create his or her own derivative works is paramount,
and it matters very little in the legal sense that members of the public wish to create their
own art based off of the original—they would be hard pressed to without risking
infringement. Even in cases where a fair use defense could be raised, the burden is on the
alleged infringer to assert that their infringement is excusable as passing the four factor
test and is thus worthy of existing in its own right. As mentioned above, copyright
protection favors the living artist, and unless fair use is found, a member of the public
will not be successful in creating their own offshoot. Here, it becomes difficult to see
where the “people” can regain power over art that surrounds them. However, instances
arise in which public interest is elevated to the point of requiring government actors to
preserve lands—or works of art—for an ongoing duration of time. This elevation of the
public’s interest over private interest in art is informed by the Public Trust Doctrine,
through which it can be argued that public art in the public domain should be held in trust
for the people to enjoy as they wish.

See § 113(c) (“In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered for sale
or other distribution to the public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the making, distribution,
or display of pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with advertisements or commentaries
related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in connection with news reports.”).
157
See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that
the infringing derivative work was “likely to fill a market niche that Castle Rock would in general
develop”); Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Plaintiffs
introduced evidence that showed that defendant’s “Lexicon would compete directly with, and impair the
sales of, Rowling's planned encyclopedia by being first to market.”).
158
Consider a local artist selling to tourists hand-sketched drawings in Manhattan’s Central Park of a
different artist’s famous statue.
156

61

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2018

IV. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC: WHO’S AFRAID OF THE PUBLIC TRUST?159
Often, a local government wants to remove, move, or modify a work of public art,
even when such action goes against prevailing public opinion.160 In such circumstances,
the government may see a better use for the land upon which the artwork sits, or is
otherwise convinced that the artwork does not meaningfully contribute to the locality in
the same way that an alternative would. However, the public may be able to coerce the
government into a “forcing,”161 or compelled ownership of the public art. While property
law recognizes eminent domain as a method by which the government may strip a party
of ownership of real property, the converse is to mandate continued, or forced, ownership
on the government. One way to force ownership of public domain public art would be to
utilize the public trust doctrine. Though the doctrine traditionally applies to the protection
of land and navigable waters, as explained below, it fits public art and there are sound
reasons to expand it. A social objective162 under the public trust doctrine’s application
need not be limited to issues of physical access, but can be expanded to include public
enjoyment163 of public works of art. The following section illustrates possible
expansions of the public trust doctrine to examples of public art from Chicago and Los
Angeles.
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine and Public Art as Public Domain Property

The public trust doctrine164 is a generations-old legal mandate that historically
requires governments to hold essential natural resources in trust for the public’s
benefit.165 Accordingly, it protects public resources from being abused or diminished
under the rationale that the people of the locality ascribe value to preserving such
159

See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What
Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800 (2004) (stating that the public trust
doctrine is an exception to traditional property law in that it holds that some resources are “subject to a
perpetual trust that forecloses private exclusion rights”). Functionally, then, the question becomes which
resources rise to the level of inalienability to make them sufficiently worthy of “public” ownership.
160
The parties in this scenario are different and have various considerations that an artist may not. Thus,
this Part assumes that there is no living artist with any rights to a contested work of public art. The art is
therefore functionally considered to be in the public domain. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious
Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 157 (2002) (pointing out
possibility of “public domain property to which no individual holds any kind of title at all”).
161
See Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2014) (defining a “forcing” as an
“involuntary imposition[] of ownership”).
162
See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 160 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that,
where defendant government could not continue with plans to build a museum on public lands, “[p]laintiffs
have sufficiently pled that the proposed Museum is not for the benefit of the public but will impair public
interest in the land and benefit the [Lucas Museum of Narrative Art],” a private nonprofit, “and promote
private and/or commercial interests”).
163
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 159, at 801–03.
164
See Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment
for Present and Future Generations: Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift (pt. 1), 39
ENVTL. L. 43, 45 (2009) (“At the core of the doctrine is the antecedent principle that every sovereign
government holds vital natural resources in “trust” for the public—present and future generations of citizen
beneficiaries.”).
165
Jordan M. Ellis, The Sky’s the Limit: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to the Atmosphere, 86 TEMP. L.
REV. 807, 810 (2014).
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resources rather than doing away with them. The trouble with the public trust doctrine is
that it places significance on whether a public entity (that is, the government) retains
ownership of the property166—in this way, the “public” and the government interests are
assumed to be one.167 The irony here is that the origin of the public trust doctrine168 was
rooted in the fact that a local government unilaterally tried to dictate the use of public
resources according to private actors’ desires rather than public opinion.169 Still, while the
“public” may not be able to dictate the use of government-owned public land, it may
exercise legal remedies if the government tries to strike deals with private companies on
lands that contain works of art the public views as sufficiently covered under a flexible
notion of “public trust.”170 It goes without saying that public art may often be viewed as
having significant social value,171 and under a more democratic definition of “public
trust,” public art may be included as “public domain property” protected under the public
trust doctrine.172 Instead of being limited to real property, the public trust doctrine should
be expanded173 to “account for public cultural interests in art . . . .”174
The general view of the public trust doctrine is that it favors environmental and
preservationist concerns over development, but its real purpose is to foster public
ownership for the sake of enjoyment of valuable resources over time.175 Despite the
doctrine’s broad mandate, it is still relatively unclear which resources are actually
covered by the doctrine or who can sue to enforce it.176 While the trend has historically
been to interpret the scope of the Doctrine’s protection conservatively,177 through a focus
on “uniquely vexed” resources such as land beneath navigable waters,178 a more
166

See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 159, at 925.
See Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 171 (Ill. 2003) (upholding the
reconstruction of Soldier Field stadium because the Chicago Park District—a government entity—retained
title to Soldier Field stadium and, thus, could develop the trust resource in a way that a private entity could
not).
168
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892), the Illinois legislature granted the
entire Chicago lakefront to a private railroad company, in blatant disregard of the inherent value of the land
to the public. The Supreme Court said, “[T]he idea that [Illinois’s] legislature can deprive the state of
control over its bed and waters, and place the same in the hands of a private corporation, created for a
different purpose,—one limited to transportation of passengers and freight between distant points and the
city,—is a proposition that cannot be defended.” Id. at 454.
169
See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 159, at 930.
170
See id. at 807 (relaying scholar Joseph Sax’s idea that the public trust doctrine should “not be
limited . . . but rather should apply ‘in a wide range of situations in which diffuse public interests need
protection against tightly organized groups with clear and immediate goals’ ”) (Joseph Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 556
(1970)).
171
See Barnett, supra note 60, at 211–12 (“[S]ome commentators have suggested that Congress extend
cultural property-type protections to certain modern works of art.”).
172
See Epstein, supra note 160, at 157 (“Public domain property is of enormous value to all members of the
public because of the unfettered use rights that it confers.”).
173
This Article’s proposed expansion of the doctrine would recognize that shared public land may itself be
more valuable because such land houses culturally significant public art.
174
Wilkes, supra note 4, at 197.
175
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 159, at 925.
176
Id. at 803.
177
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999).
178
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 159, at 928.
167
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expansive view of what qualifies as a “resource” is merited. The argument that is most
relevant for expanding the doctrine to public art is furthered by prominent scholar
Richard A. Epstein.179 He suggests that the public trust doctrine should apply to
intellectual property—specifically, forms of expression in the public domain.180
Intellectual property “in the public domain” are works that have lapsed copyrights or are
otherwise available for people to use without worry of infringing copyright protections
due to those materials’ overarching social value, as is the case with historical facts.181
Because the artist copyright holder is no longer an interested party in a public domain
work, the public should own the property.182 Though a work that has entered the public
domain after its copyright has lapsed may not retain as much economic value for the
artist as when its copyright was active,183 it can be extremely valuable to a secondary user
for creative, aesthetic, or inspirational reasons. For this reason, it follows that a work of
public art should be considered “public domain property” to be protected under the public
trust doctrine. This legal designation keeps a work of public art from suddenly being
made private through title transfer to some individual or entity, preventing the public
from using or enjoying the work.184
As it is, a governmental “giveaway” to a private actor under a public trust
framework has a strong potential to harm the public interest no matter what form of
property is given.185 When something has been enjoyed and owned by the public—like
public art in the public domain—then subsequent privatization of it186 takes away those
shared rights. Epstein writes, “[i]t hardly matters that these are rights to pictures and
stories instead of rights to walk along public ways or swim in public waters.” 187 Per
Epstein, when a work of public art that is in the public domain is under threat of being
removed, relocated, destroyed, or sold by the government to a private entity, then the
public trust doctrine should apply to preserve it. Concerned citizens should have the right
to evoke the doctrine to protect the public asset. Giving away public property—even if it

179

While Epstein speaks of intangible goods in the context of term extension, such arguments can be
extended to tangible objects such as works of public art.
180
Epstein, supra note 160, at 156–58.
181
See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 245–46 (1918) (holding that copyright does not
take historical facts out of the public domain).
182
See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 673, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (drawing attention,
for class certification purposes, to the distinction between authors who could agree to transfer of their
copyright ownership and those who could not because they were unknown authors of “orphan works.”
“[H]ere class members would be giving up certain property rights in their creative works, and they would
be deemed—by their silence—to have granted to Google a license to future use of their copyrighted
works.”). This suggests that, if it can be proven that a copyright holder is no longer an interested party in
his or her copyright, then the work can be considered public domain property.
183
Epstein, supra note 160, at 125.
184
Id. at 157.
185
Id.
186
When public art is sold or given to a private entity (or relocated or removed for the purpose of selling
the land on which public art sits) a host of attacks on the art’s public nature may be commenced, such as
destruction, removal, sale, or obscuring. Under such theories, the art’s “publicness” is lost.
187
Epstein, supra note 160, at 157.
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is in the form of a marble statue instead of a sandy seabed—is risky business,188 and the
public should retain the rightful check on government power to dispose of public
property that it has historically enjoyed under the public trust doctrine.189
B.

The Government’s Duty to Hold Public Artwork in Trust for the People

If public art is in the public domain such that it can be protected under the public
trust doctrine,190 then it follows that the government must maintain it despite any fiscal or
alternative spatial interests the government may have in transferring it to a private entity.
The complication, however, is in determining which pieces of artwork should rise to this
level of this protection. This Article proposes that the test for protecting art under the
public trust doctrine, though a normative one,191 should focus on whether the public art in
question has reached the benchmark of constituting cultural or community identity for the
locality. This ensures that culturally significant artworks are protected: as such, this is a
superior barometer for measuring community value than a purely fiscal or culturallyblind test. Though it is not mainstream yet, the idea that there is a responsibility to
preserve a people’s shared heritage—be it through a human artifact, a natural object, or a
landscape—is the thrust of viewing cultural heritage as part of public trust.192 In fact,
some eminent scholars have determined the public trust doctrine to be “the most
appropriate legal doctrine for explaining the public interest and for protecting the rights
of a cultural group in its cultural property,” and have advocated for extending the public
trust doctrine to protecting cultural heritage.193 A piece of public art can attain so much
community significance that it becomes a crucial part of a locality’s cultural heritage,
elevating the work to a status of evoking community pride.194 When this happens, the
people should retain a public trust interest in the work,195 with the government acting as
trustee for the community’s benefit.196
See id. at 157–58 (“[I]t hardly matters whether we start with the Copyright Clause, the First
Amendment, or even the public trust doctrine. All roads lead to Rome: the condemnation of government
giveaways.”).
189
See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the
United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 651 (1995) (arguing that the public trust doctrine imposes a trust
standard and, thus, when this doctrine is applied to significant public art, it “imbues the protection of
cultural property with the doctrine’s trust relationship and imposes a fiduciary standard upon that
relationship”).
190
See Wilkes, supra note 4, at 196 (arguing that, although the “public trust doctrine has never been
extended to protect the public interest in works of art,” there is a recognition of “the necessity for more
extensive regulation to safeguard public expectations in objects that have become part of a local cultural
heritage”).
191
There is no legal framework to determine this, given that this is a proposed idea for incorporating public
art into public trust protection.
192
Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preservation As a Public Duty: The Abbe Gregoire and the Origins of an Idea,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1142 (1990).
193
Gerstenblith, supra note 189, at 647.
194
Smith, supra note 2, at 380–81.
195
Id. at 381.
196
See id. at 383 (“When a piece of public art comes to embody a community's identity and culture, when it
becomes a landmark or identifying symbol of a community, when it comes to define a community's social
relationships, sustain the community's social rules, or strengthen the community's social values, it
transcends being just a piece of art and becomes part of a community's heritage. It becomes ‘the property of
188
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While governments frequently prohibit the destruction of those things that create
cultural heritage, works of art are often overlooked as public goods and are instead
viewed as private commodities.197 But the case for including art in a public trust
framework becomes obvious when a work of public art is so widely-recognized, or is so
iconic to its locality, that its removal, alteration, or sale would pose a deep cultural
loss.198 Public art captures the pulse of a culture as a snapshot in time. It speaks to the
achievements of citizens and their expression of both personal and communal identity.199
Art is an element of a “collective enterprise.”200 Preserving public art as public trust
property reinforces the idea that cultural life is just as worthy of supporting as nature.201
To erase public art that has become a piece of a people’s cultural heritage is to distort a
necessary past upon which a new tomorrow can be built.202 Preserving cultural property
is not unlike preventing the adulteration of land: we protect it so as not to render the
resource barren.203 To remove public art of community value would be to render the
culture surrounding it void.
1.

The Chicago Picasso

The Chicago Picasso is an untitled sculpture created by Pablo Picasso that was
commissioned in the 1960s by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, one of the architectural
firms working on Chicago’s Civic Center, now known as the Daley Center.204 Picasso
created the sculpture in steel: the work weighed in at 162 tons and stood fifty feet tall.205
It was dedicated206 to the City of Chicago on August 15, 1967, when then-mayor Richard
J. Daley unveiled the work in Daley Plaza. Mayor Daley was particularly thrilled because
Picasso had made the sculpture specifically for Chicago.207 Exhibiting uncanny foresight
as to the impact the art would one day have, Daley stated at the dedication, “We dedicate
this celebrated work this morning with the belief that what is strange to us today will be
mankind and ownership carries with it the obligation to preserve [it].’ ”) (quoting JOSEPH SAX, PLAYING
DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 35 (2001)).
197
Sax, supra note 192, at 1142.
198
See id. at 1143 (discussing the public outrage that took place when the private owner of Stonehenge
threatened its sale).
199
See id. at 1156 (discussing the importance of artifacts in general as representing culture and politics).
200
Id. at 1160.
201
Id. at 1163.
202
See id. at 1157–58 (quoting Abbé Grégoire, that “national objects which, belonging to no one, are the
property of all” and indicating that “common property” or “common heritage” must be maintained).
203
See Gerstenblith, supra note 189, at 651 (“The development of the public trust doctrine from a narrow
application to protect specific natural resources to a more expansive use to protect the environment
parallels the development of our society’s consciousness of, and appreciation for, first, scenic beauty, and
then later, the broader environment.”) (footnote omitted).
204
Alan G. Artner, Chicago's Picasso Sculpture, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2007, 2:13 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-picasso-story-story.html.
205
Id.
206
See Wilkes, supra note 4, at 196 (“The common law doctrine of public dedication enables the public to
acquire rights in property that is [sic] useful to promote the public welfare. The doctrine reflects a
combination of gift and contract law.”).
207
Ron Grossman, 50 Years Ago, Picasso's Sculpture Challenged Chicago's Imagination, CHI. TRIB. (Aug.
6, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-picasso-50-years-daleyplaza-flashback-perspec-0806-jm-20170803-story.html.
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familiar tomorrow.”208 Part of the confusion that Mayor Daley anticipated at the time of
the dedication was a debate over what the sculpture was supposed to be; onlookers
vacillated between thinking it was an animal of some kind, a flying nun, butterfly wings,
or the head of a woman.209 Those that disfavored the installation of the sculpture believed
that Picasso had no right to create art for Chicago because he was neither born nor raised
there.210 However, Mayor Daley remained steadfast in preserving the sculpture by the
renowned artist because of the community value he believed it would have.211
Furthermore, Picasso did not accept a penny for his efforts in creating the sculpture,
insisting that the Chicago Picasso was a gift to the city.212 What is even more unusual,
given that the sculpture was a gift, is that Picasso refused to transfer the copyright for it to
the City of Chicago.213 In fact, there was no actual copyright in the work.214 Despite that
salient detail, the city incorrectly assumed that it could not collect licensing fees for
derivative works such as “ashtrays and shot glasses” containing the sculpture’s image as
the sculpture grew increasingly “iconic” of Chicago.215 However, in 1970, a federal judge
for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the Chicago Picasso could not actually be
copyrighted because it was a copy itself of the “maquette,” or model, of what the
sculpture would ultimately be.216 In its holding, the court noted that “[t]he monumental
sculpture did not exist at this point in time and accordingly there could be no copyright in
the monumental sculpture . . . .”217 This “maquette” did not have a copyright notice
affixed to it, and pictures of it were published without copyright notice as well.218 The
Art Institute sold photographs of the maquette, and these too had no copyright notice.219
In October 1967, the Public Building Commission of Chicago engraved the granite
base of the sculpture to read that the sculpture was “given to the people of Chicago by the
artist Pablo Picasso”; thus, it was determined that the work was dedicated in 1967.220
However, it was not until 1968 that the Commission filed its application for a copyright
to the “Chicago Picasso.”221 But, pursuant to the law at the time, copyright could not
subsist in a work that was already in the public domain.222 Thus, the court held that,
208

Id.
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
What must be noted is that Pablo Picasso did not even own a copyright to the Chicago Picasso. Thus,
there was no copyright over which Picasso could refuse transfer. The Northern District of Illinois held that
there could be no copyright without meeting the now-moot notice requirement of the Copyright Act of
1909. The case was heard prior to the codification of the Copyright Act of 1976, so the requirements for
copyright were based on the formalities of the 1909 Act, which were eliminated under the current 1976
Act. See Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1310 (N.D.
Ill. 1970).
214
Id.
215
Grossman, supra note 207.
216
Black Press, Inc., 320 F. Supp. at 1310.
217
Id.
218
Black Press, Inc., 320 F. Supp. at 1306.
219
Id. at 1307.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 1308.
222
Id. at 1310.
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pursuant to the formalities of the copyright laws at the time, the Chicago Picasso was
“placed into the public domain prior to the attachment of copyright notice” and thus
could no longer be copyrighted.223 Following this legal clarification, people freely made
reproductions of the sculpture, leading to “familiarity, the first step toward love” in the
public mind.224 Indeed, the beloved Chicago Picasso still stands today, solidifying its
place as an icon of the city.225
2.

The Great Wall of Los Angeles

Heralded as a cultural landmark of Los Angeles and a monument to “inter-racial
harmony,”226 The History of California— referred to as the Great Wall of Los Angeles—
serves as a symbol of public art as cultural heritage in the public domain. The mural was
created as a community labor of love. In 1974, the Army Corps of Engineers approached
the founder of Social and Public Art Resource Center (SPARC),227 Judith F. Baca, about
creating a mural in the Tujunga Flood Control Channel as part of a beautification
project.228 The project, which is ongoing to this day, is unique in that its creation is not
rooted in a singular “artist,” but rather, a group comprised of community members and
organizations, businesses, government agencies, minors in the juvenile justice system,
and other individuals—all known as “Mural Makers.”229 In this way, the project is truly
community-focused. The purpose of the mural is to add the histories of California’s
various ethnic groups to the larger cultural dialogue of the city of Los Angeles and tell
their stories of struggle and triumph.230 It is an ongoing project and one that the locality
views as part of the fabric of its identity.
The Great Wall of Los Angeles is noteworthy because of the significant
implications that would result from a governmental attempt to remove it. The project is
the product of many entities with both a financial and emotional stake in the venture, so
the impetus for the government to act as a trustee over this important marker of cultural
heritage is paramount.231 There is something special about shared resources: they

223

Id. at 1309; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1 (1946) (repealed 1947).
Artner, supra note 204.
225
See Grossman, supra note 207 (“ . . . Picasso’s statue grew on Chicagoans. Children delighted in
climbing up it and sliding down . . . . [T]he plaza became Chicago’s equivalent of the ancient Roman
Forum. Visitors asked their Chicago hosts to take them there.”).
226
The Great Wall of Los Angeles, SPARCINLA, http://sparcinla.org/programs/the-great-wall-mural-losangeles/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
227
SPARC’s mission statement reads, “SPARC’s intent is to examine what we choose to memorialize
through public art, to devise and innovate excellent art pieces; and ultimately, to provide empowerment
through participatory processes to residents and communities excluded from civic debate. SPARC’s works
are never simply individually authored endeavors, but rather a collaboration between artists and
communities, resulting in art which rises from within the community, rather than being imposed upon it.”
About SPARC, SPARCINLA, http://sparcinla.org/about-sparc/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2018).
228
The Great Wall — History and Description, SPARCINLA, http://sparcinla.org/the-great-wall-part-2/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
229
The Great Wall of Los Angeles, supra note 226.
230
The Great Wall — History and Description, supra note 228.
231
See Michael A. de Gennaro, The “Public Trust” Servitude: Creating a Policy-Based Paradigm for
Copyright Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1131, 1151 (2005) (“Real property
and intellectual property both retain characteristics of public goods in the sense that the public derives
224
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represent the coming together of people with a common interest in a public good.232
When people contemplate whether public trust protections should apply to a given
resource, they must hold the underlying belief that there are certain pieces of property
that are so integral to the identity of the public that the public “has a reasonable
expectation of their use.”233 Given that baseline, when a work is never privately owned
but instead has always been in the public domain, it confers more rights to the general
public than those they historically were able to enjoy. What distinguishes the Great Wall
of Los Angeles from other murals234 is that it exists on government property rather than
privately-owned property.235 Thus, the people have a stronger claim to collective rights
over this work instead of diluted-to-nonexistent rights over privately-owned property.
And because the people created this work of art for themselves, the government would be
very hard-pressed to remove the work in any way. If a mural such as the Great Wall of
Los Angeles becomes such an integral part of the fiber of the cultural heritage of Los
Angeles, it should be maintained by the government under the public trust doctrine, even
if the government would prefer a more lucrative use of the site.236 The Great Wall of Los
Angeles is a living, breathing work of public art with the precise goal of creating cultural
heritage by the community, for that community. If heritage or resources are to be
protected for the enjoyment of the people, this lauded237 mural comes very close to the
paradigmatic goal.
For both the Chicago Picasso and the Great Wall of Los Angeles, their respective
communities have celebrated the works and accepted them as part of their cultural
heritage. These works of art have been protected by their local governments in trust for
their citizenry and serve as models of effective public art preservation. As such, the
public has attained the right to enjoy these works, and to ensure that they remain for
however long it finds meaning and significance in them. These examples of public
artworks therefore reflect how salient the public trust framework can be in regards to
preserving cultural property. It follows, then, that the public trust doctrine’s relationship
to community public art can be just as applicable as its relationship to natural resources
when it comes to fostering wellbeing. Preserving cultural identity is critical, and a public
trust mechanism guarantees that as long as the public wishes to enjoy a work of art, there
is a protective mandate ensuring that wish is met.
benefits from them, with or without laws governing them. For this reason, the law must treat shared
resources differently, giving respect to the inherent public character of the property being controlled.”).
232
Id.
233
Id. at 1168.
234
An example of such a work is 5Pointz, a graffiti mural painted on private property which was effaced
overnight when the owner of the warehouse on which the mural was painted sold the property. See Nina
Agrawal, A New York Lawsuit Asks: Is Graffiti Art Protected Under Federal Law?, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17,
2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-5pointz-graffiti-art-2017-story.html.
235
Ephrat Livni, A Judge Is Poised to Decide Whether Graffiti Can Be Protected by Law, QUARTZ (Oct. 20,
2017), https://qz.com/1107031/new-yorks-5pointz-graffiti-artists-are-suing-a-real-estate-developer-fordestroying-their-work/.
236
See Katyal, supra note 137, at 1165 (“The role of public trustee requires a sincere commitment to
openness.”).
237
Maximilíano Durón, Concrete History: Chicana Muralist Judith F. Baca Goes from the Great Wall to
the Museum Wall, ARTNEWS (Apr. 19, 2017, 9:10 AM), http://www.artnews.com/2017/04/19/concretehistory-chicana-muralist-judith-f-baca-goes-from-the-great-wall-to-the-museum-wall/.
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V. CONFEDERATE MONUMENTS AND COMMUNITY REJECTION
A major caveat to the need for public art protection under the public trust doctrine
emerges when the public develops disdain for the public art sufficient to undermine its
cultural value. The public trust doctrine focuses on holding resources in the public trust
for the “benefit” of citizens, such that they can “enjoy them” over time. 238 If, however, a
work of public art is so distasteful to the community or otherwise unvalued, it would not
rise to the level of “cultural heritage” that should be protected under the public trust
rationale. Thus, a work of public art should be protected under the public trust doctrine
only if it has reached the requisite cultural value to the people. To hold a publicly rejected
artwork as protectable under the doctrine would appear to be an affront to the notion of a
fiduciary duty based on preserving a resource to bring enjoyment: a community does not
derive pleasure from values it rejects. So, this type of artwork could justifiably be
removed or destroyed by the government,239 assuming again that the artist is not a
relevant player in the decision, which follows from the general framework that has been
discussed above. If the people do not value a work as intrinsic to their cultural heritage,
then that public art, though in the public domain, need not be protected under the public
trust rationale.
A.

Confederate Monuments: Undoing “Heritage”

One of the most divisive and heated issues in the cultural debate over the role of
public art has focused on the pervasive presence of Confederate monuments
commemorating the Civil War South.240 This problem of competing goals—some more
preservationist, some more abolitionist—encapsulates the conflict between public
opinion and governmental opinion. Various local and state governments have taken a
variety of stances on the issue of Confederate monuments, adding new and nuanced
interests to the scheme of public art preservation.241 Increasingly, majority factions of the
public want to remove the historic public art because they are ideologically against what
the art represents. In this way, some of the public desires an outcome that the government
is not providing. Still, there is as much resistance to removing “history” among different
factions of the public—in which case some of the public is against proposals by the
government to remove or relocate monuments. How much of the pro-removal or anti238

Barnett, supra note 60, at 214–15.
Id. at 215.
240
See Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.html; Amy Held, Shrouds
Pulled from Charlottesville Confederate Statues, Following Ruling, NPR (Feb. 28, 2018, 12:28 PM);
Meghan Keneally, How Richmond Is Addressing the Debate over Confederate Monuments One Year After
Charlottesville, ABC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2018, 1:53 PM) (covering the violent 2017 protests in Charlottesville,
Virginia over the removal of a statue of General Robert E. Lee).
241
See Keneally, supra note 240 (stating that political activists in Richmond, VA are striving to have
Confederate monuments removed so that the monuments no longer serve as “pilgrimage sites” and locales
for white supremacist rallies); Laura Ellyn Smith, It’s Not Just Confederate Monuments that Need to Come
Down, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-byhistory/wp/2018/08/10/its-not-just-confederate-monuments-that-need-to-comedown/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2b1bcc14d7bd. (stating that white nationalists have been uniting to
defend enshrined icons who represent their push for “white rights.”).
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removal rhetoric is rooted in existing racial biases and allegiances is a debate for another
time. The more narrowed focus for purposes of this Article is whose opinion should
govern in the face of community tumult surrounding art that is no longer viewed as a
source of “enjoyment” for the public, treating Confederate statues and monuments as a
case study. The Confederate monument debate, then, is a classic example of the public
versus the government. It is about the value of history and governmental speech in a
modern society.242
B.

The Public Landscape as a Culture-Creator

The landscapes that local governments create for the public inevitably shape culture
and socialize citizens.243 As governmental action pertains to Confederate statues and
monuments, proponents of removal argue that the “built environment”244 of a locality
housing these monuments fosters a misleading rhetoric that has a sinister function:
glorifying the Confederacy’s endeavor to preserve slavery.245 Opponents of removing
public art that monumentalizes the Confederacy argue that to obliterate history would
lead to chaos down the road, in which history would be deleted at the whim of whoever’s
opinion controls at the time.246 Adding to this complication is that it is ultimately the
state’s role in determining what should be a state-protected artifact of history, as well as
balancing “the citizens’ interest in them, and whether the present societal culture
demands the removal of some, if not all . . . Confederate monuments.”247
While the states are entrusted with this difficult task of weighing the public and
state government’s interests separately, there is concern over whether modern
governmental officials could take steps that would potentially constrain or over-empower
future officials faced with the same dilemma.248 Oftentimes, states have acted defensively
in anticipation of pushback from future generations of citizens advocating for monument
removal.249 By drafting such statutes far in advance of any contemporary debate, these
242

The discourse is entrenched in faction fighting between groups of people who want to retain the statues
and monuments because of their “historical” significance and opposing groups that want Confederate
statues removed because they tip their hat to slavery and racial oppression. The discussion is fundamentally
a power struggle in itself.
243
See Stephen Clowney, Landscape Fairness: Removing Discrimination from the Built Environment, 2013
UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (arguing that landscape “inscribes selective and misleading versions of the past in
solid, material forms” and that these narratives adversely affect African-American communities in
particular because they “transmit ideas about racial power across generations”).
244
Id.
245
See Sanford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holidays, and the
Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1079, 1082–83 (1995).
(Writing that public art is often “self-consciously” chosen to “symbolize the public order and to inculcate in
its viewers appropriate attitudes toward that order.”).
246
See L.A. TIMES EDITORIAL BOARD, Why on Earth Do We Have Confederate Statues in the U.S.
Capitol?, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-statuescongress-confederate-lee-booker-20170922-story.html.
247
Blake Alderman, Baltimore’s Monumental Question: Can the Heightened Social Conscience Against the
Confederacy Rewrite the Constitutional Right to Due Process?, 5 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 131, 131–32
(2016).
248
Aneil Kovvali, Confederate Statute Removal, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 82, 82–83 (2017).
249
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1(b) (2015) (constraining the possibility of removal in the future,
stating, “An object of remembrance that is permanently relocated shall be relocated to a site of similar
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laws have raised questions about the voting process and the democratic relationship
between state legislators and their voters.250 These questions arise because legislative
decisions are often made binding on future actions; functionally, they “take power out of
the hands of current voters and amplify the effect of decisions by past voters. . . . They
are a current attempt to privilege the decisions of a past voting pool over the decisions of
the very different modern voting pool.”251 Because of this limiting legislation, elected
officials have to be even more mindful of how they balance the interests of their modern
communities and their history. Furthermore, they must maintain a system where voters
still have influence.252 Statutes can be undone:253 they can either be repealed by the
legislature or otherwise declared unconstitutional by the courts. However, undoing law is
difficult, and this must be kept in mind when passing new statues designed to address
future problems.
Indeed, historic preservation is a salient goal: “Confederate monuments, as
standing reminders of all implications of the Civil War, provide the benefits of historical
education, social understanding, and cultural inheritance.”254 Yet, a decision to preserve
these monuments under a historical or cultural preservation rationale merits consideration
of what they actually represent. Yes, historical monuments such as those representing the
Confederacy may “provide the benefits of historical context, education, tradition, and
information,” but they may simultaneously depict a skewed history that romanticizes the
Confederate South instead of giving an accurate portrayal of the horrors of slavery.255
With this conflict in mind, state governments should consider a variety of options that
meet both a preservationist goal as well as a landscape-fairness256 goal: the idea that
remedying the one-sided historical messaging of Confederate monuments placement by
adding other, more honest, accounts of history to the built environment of the locality
will improve minorities’ perceptions of themselves. To achieve this, options for
Confederate monument removal might include relocation to a less prominent site that
serves a historical and educational function; modification of the monument to retell a
more accurate account of history; mitigation of the effects of these monuments by
prominence, honor, visibility, availability, and access that are within the boundaries of the jurisdiction from
which it was relocated.”). This procedure makes removal near impossible. North Carolina Historical
Commission member Samuel Dixon addressed the limitations in this North Carolina law and the need to
get creative as to workarounds, stating, “I believe the monuments need to tell the truth and based upon the
law that we have today I do not think we can move them.” However, Dixon went on to express his belief
that North Carolina can “tell a better story . . . a full and inclusive story” through contextualizing the state’s
Confederate monuments with new additions. Martha Waggoner & Gary D. Robertson, North Carolina Will
Keep Three Confederate Monuments at Capitol, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 22, 2018, 6:39 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2018-08-22/fate-of-3-more-confederate-monuments-in-nc-to-bediscussed.
250
Kovvali, supra note 248, at 88.
251
Id. For an example of such legislation, see § 100-2.1(b).
252
Kovvali, supra note 2488, at 88.
253
If legislators are convinced that certain laws are deliberately crippling, then perhaps such laws will be
repealed over time. Such action is possible unless there is a preemption barrier.
254
Alderman, supra note 247, at 140.
255
Id. at 155.
256
See Clowney, supra note 243, at 13 (suggesting that placing Confederate monuments in prominent
positions “deliberately mislead[s] interpretations of history [to] conspire to ingrain ideas about racial
hierarchy . . . and send messages that African Americans are not full members of the polity”).
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installing new monuments depicting different historical events;257 or outright removal for
extreme scenarios where the monument serves no beneficial function, either historically
or culturally.258
C.

A Monumental Framework: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum

It is rather unsurprising that the removal or preservation of Confederate statues and
monuments have rarely been litigated. It is a more recent topic of debate that has
analogues in state or locality monument removal or placement generally.259 The highest
legal authority on the topic of local governments and their monument removal is a
Supreme Court case decided in 2009, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum.260 This case was
argued under a First Amendment doctrine, with the plaintiff religious organization,
Summum, arguing that Pleasant Grove City, Utah could not reject the placement of a
monument of religious significance to the group in a public park when other, similar
monuments existed there.261 The city’s rejection of Summum’s monument was based on
its policy of limiting park monuments to those either directly related to the city’s history
or those donated by groups with longstanding community ties; in this case, the plaintiff
organization did not attempt to prove the historical significance of its monument nor the
group’s connection to the city.262 The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by
Justice Alito, rejected the court of appeal’s holding that parks were public forums under
First Amendment jurisprudence, which would have required the government to install
Summum’s monuments.263 Reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court held that
placing permanent monuments in public parks is not a type of expression to which forum
analysis264 applied; instead, such placement constituted government speech (rather than
speech by the public) and is thus not subject to Free Speech Clause scrutiny.265
257

Id. at 46.
See Edward T. Linenthal, The Contested Landscape of American Memorialization: Levinson’s Written
in Stone, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 249, 252 (2000) (book review) (stating that scholar Sanford Levinson
contemplates that there may be memorials “so repellent that they should be destroyed”).
259
See, e.g., Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F. Supp. 3d 573, 581 (E.D. La. 2016), aff’d sub
nom. Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Chao, 678 F. App’x 250 (5th Cir. 2017) (Plaintiffs filed for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the City of New Orleans because the city’s
mayor, Mitchell Landrieu, had called upon the New Orleans City Council to commence removal of four
public monuments: three Confederate monuments and one monument commemorating an 1874 conflict in
which members of the white supremacist organization, the White League, attacked and killed members of
the city’s first integrated police force. The court found for the defendants, holding that no statutory or
constitutional rights were violated by the city council’s vote to remove the monuments, and that the mayor
subsequently signing into law that they be removed from publicly owned property.).
260
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
261
Id. at 472.
262
Id. at 465-66.
263
Id. at 464; Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044, 1056 (10th Cir. 2007).
264
Public forum analysis under First Amendment jurisprudence addresses locations traditionally utilized for
public speech. The types of public forums are traditional public forums, limited public forums, designated
public forums, and nonpublic forums. Depending on the type of forum, the government may or may not be
able to restrict speech or other forms of First Amendment expression taking place at the forum location. See
Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
679 (2010) (“First, in a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine when a
governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.”).
265
Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 481.
258
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While the thrust of Pleasant Grove is a free speech argument, the local government
concerns that the Court articulated with respect to monuments are informative for the
Confederate statue debate. This is because they portray the local government interest as
highly significant when it comes to decisions relating to public monuments.266 While the
Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech, it does not regulate
“government speech.”267 Thus, the Supreme Court interprets the selection, commission,
or rejection of monuments as valid exercise of speech by the local government. 268 The
majority in Pleasant Grove was concerned with the proper functioning of government,
suggesting that if the government is restrained from making decisions that shape the kind
of community image it wishes to foster for its citizens, governance itself would fall into
disarray.269
The Court was resolute in its position that permanently displayed monuments on
public property represent government speech.270 As Justice Alito wrote in his majority
opinion for Pleasant Grove, “A monument, by definition, is a structure that is designed as
a means of expression,”271 noting insightfully that “[g]overnments have long used
monuments to speak to the public.”272 “When a government entity arranges for the
construction of a monument, it does so because it wishes to convey some thought or
instill some feeling in those who see the structure.”273 Still, Justice Alito acknowledged
that when government decision-makers select the monuments that “portray what they
view as appropriate for the place in question,” they take “content-based” factors into
account, such as “esthetics, history, and local culture.”274 Furthermore, Justice Alito
attempted to describe the way that monuments convey meaning, suggesting a more fluid
view of how to interpret works of art. He wrote that “the monument may be intended to
be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted by different observers, in a variety of
ways.”275 This view encourages the ethos that people may think for themselves when they
are faced with an idea or symbol. For the Court, monuments are given meaning by those
who experience them; they do not merely disseminate a particular view.276 When a
government entity installs a monument in the public arena, it “does not necessarily
See Monumental Task Comm., Inc., v. Foxx, 157 F. Supp. 3d 573, 581 (E.D. La. 2016), aff’d sub nom.,
Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Chao, 678 F. App’x 250 (5th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that citizens may not
“compel” the City to promote their culture).
267
Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467.
268
See id. (“A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’ ”) (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000)); see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524
U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor
points of view . . . .”).
269
See Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 468 (pointing out that the government may not violate existing
constitutional restraints, such as the Establishment Clause).
270
See id. at 470 (“Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public.”).
271
Id. Perhaps implicit in this opinion is a suggestion from Justice Alito that the petitioners were wrong to
challenge the government as they did; instead, if they had argued that the government’s choice of the
monuments violated the Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause, the outcome may have been
different.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 472.
275
Id. at 474.
276
Id.
266
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endorse the specific meaning,” but finds that there is some significance to having it on
display out in the open.277
It follows then, that if governments can utilize monuments to convey a message,
then Confederate statues fall under governments’ purview as well in terms of the
controlling point of view as to the monument’s destiny in public rhetoric. However, the
Court does not envision a static, unilateral message to be conveyed by a monument. In
fact, Justice Alito wrote in Pleasant Grove that if a government entity conveys a message
by allowing a monument to remain on public property, then it can also alter that message
by adding more monuments to the area.278 Importantly, he also contemplated that
“messages” in public art can change over time, and people can “reinterpret” what
memorials mean as society changes.279 This robust dicta is extremely helpful to any
burgeoning conversation about Confederate statue removal because it clearly describes
both the government’s rights over monuments generally, and how monuments
themselves can be imbued with changing meaning given the time and social
circumstances.280
This legal framework seems to tip the scale in favor of the local government’s
exercise of discretion regarding Confederate statue removal, irrespective of public
opinion. Still, as far as public opinion can influence official decision-making, the public
can play a role in this governmental determination—at least in the sense of public opinion
mattering in official decisions. Ultimately, even if the public does not have the ability to
change the treatment of Confederate statues immediately, it always has the power to vote
out the governing officials it disagrees with.281
D.

State Initiatives and Constraints

As aforementioned, states have the power—setting aside legislative limitations
penned by prior officials282—to act when it comes to Confederate statue and monument
removal. Of course, while states have an established right to engage in government
speech, in making the decision to preserve or remove Confederate monuments, a truly
equitable approach must take into account the negative impacts caused by depicting a
one-sided version of history.283 Several southern states that have a sizeable number of
Confederate monuments have started taking steps to solve the dilemma of preserving a
skewed history while also acknowledging the concerns of citizens objecting to the moral
277

Id. at 476–77.
Id. at 477.
279
Id.
280
See id. at 477–78 (discussing how the Statue of Liberty has evolved throughout the centuries as to what
it represents for people).
281
See Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F. Supp. 3d 573, 603 (E.D. La. 2016), aff’d sub nom.,
Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Chao, 678 F. App’x 250 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[Plaintiff’s] recourse is to the
ballot—not the courts.”) (quoting Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm’n of Calcasieu Par., 561 So.2d 482,
491 (La. 1990)).
282
In certain instances, localities are driven to search for loopholes in statutory language to get around
restricting state laws. See infra Part V-B.
283
SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 107 (Benjamin
Lee ed., 1998) (riting, “…foolish indeed is the person who underestimates their [symbols’] importance.
Symbols are an important part of the cultural exchange system that, among other things, established
relationships of hierarchy and domination.”).
278
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implications of these monuments. While such proposals are fledgling, they mark a
necessary commencement to the discussion of Confederate monuments and their public
value.
1.

Virginia

In September 2017, Richmond City’s mayor, Levar Stoney, established the
Monument Avenue Commission (Monument Commission) to study the issue of
Confederate statue removal as it pertained to “Monument Avenue” in Richmond,
Virginia.284 However, later that same month, the City Council of Richmond introduced a
resolution seeking the State General Assembly’s permission to remove five Confederate
statues from the city’s “Monument Avenue.”285 The City Council decided to address the
issue without waiting for the Monument Commission’s decision, despite the mayor’s
grant of authority to the specialized Monument Commission.286 Instead of deferring to
the mayor’s Commission, the city councilors wrote a resolution to remove the statues,
saying that the “large white nationalist rally in Charlottesville . . . ‘demonstrates that
memorials to historical figures associated with the Confederate States of America such as
these five statues on Monument Avenue continue to inspire racial division.’ ”287
The rationale for pushing this resolution without waiting for the Monument
Commission’s approval was the significance the councilors placed on clearing up
ambiguity as to whether or not state laws protected these “war memorials.”288
Councilman Michael Jones was vocal about his thoughts on Confederate statue removal,
stating that, despite divisions in public opinion as to whether to preserve the statues in
their current location or remove them, “we should be asking if they are morally right.” 289
Additionally, Councilman Jones noted that African-Americans comprised just over fifty
percent of Richmond’s population stating, “If this city were 51-percent Jewish and you
had an avenue lined with swastikas, monuments to Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime—it
would not stand. . . . We wouldn’t even be having this conversation.”290 Councilman
Jones’s statements make clear that he believes removing the Confederate statues would
not undermine history, but that keeping these statues on Monument Avenue would be to
“romanticiz[e]” or “memorializ[e] these men as if they were heroes of all of America.”291

See Oliver & Robinson, supra note 31 (writing that Monument Avenue is one of the “largest and oldest
collections of Confederate memorials in the nation”).
285
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. There is apparently a 1997 amendment to the state laws of Virginia that prohibits cities from
removing war memorials. See Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-1812 “If such [Confederate or Union monuments or
memorials of the War Between the States] are erected, it shall be unlawful for the authorities of the locality,
or any other person or persons, to disturb or interfere with any monuments or memorials so erected, or to
prevent its citizens from taking proper measures and exercising proper means for the protection,
preservation and care of same.”).
289
Shelby Brown et al., Richmond Councilman Drafts Resolution to Remove Confederate Statues, WTVR,
https://wtvr.com/2017/09/21/city-councilman-drafts-resolution-to-remove-confederate-statues/ (last
updated Sept. 22, 2017, 6:52 PM).
290
Id.
291
Id.
284
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The problem confronting local governments, then, is deciding which version of
history should be disseminated to the general public, a public that may vehemently
oppose a falsely rosy portrait of the Confederate South.292 As Councilman Jones stated,
“It is not just history. . . . It’s a dark part of history that should not be celebrated.”293
While it is generally accepted that the Civil War was a dark time in American history, the
public voiced disagreement with Councilman Jones’ contention that Richmond’s history
was not well-served by keeping the city’s Confederate statues in place. One Richmond
resident stated, “I’m sorry, but if everybody took something down that offended them,
then we wouldn’t have any monuments or anything to look back on as far as our
history.”294 The hesitance shown by certain members of the public toward removing the
statues may fairly be seen as resistance to paternalism and a reluctance to allow the
government to filter history for the public.
A unique perspective on the issue of Confederate statue removal can be gleaned
from a historic family—the Lees of Virginia, descendants of Confederate General Robert
E. Lee. Many of Lee’s descendants are publicly advocating for the removal of
Confederate statues—including those of their ancestor.295 Historians regard the modernday disagreement in perspectives over the Confederacy as a “masterful” new federal
campaign that is “aimed at restoring and bolstering white supremacy in the South through
the mythology of the ‘Lost Cause.’ ”296 Robert E. Lee has in fact become the “centerpiece
of the Lost Cause campaign,” giving Confederate sympathizers a symbol to cling to in
advancing the “soften[ed],” romanticized Confederate rhetoric.297 Even still, members of
Lee’s family believe that “glossing over the maintenance of slavery as the South’s
overriding war aim” by advocating for the “Lost Cause” is misplaced.298 As one relative
stated, “Supporters of the statues still want to persuade people they’re not about white
supremacy. It’s time to bring the statues down.”299 A Virginia resident unrelated to the
Lee family gave a more evenhanded statement, suggesting that Lee did good things as
well and would not have wanted to be heralded as a champion of slavery. However, she
conceded that “we have to acknowledge we’re not living in General Lee’s time period
any more” and that “[i]f communities decide to take the statue down, then I’m not against

See Tracy Sears, ‘Take ‘Em Down Now’: Residents Have Their Voices Heard on Confederate Statues,
WTVR, http://wtvr.com/2017/09/26/city-residents-have-their-voices-heard-on-confederate-statues/
(quoting a city resident as saying, “These men weren’t heroes. . . . They betrayed our nation. They weren’t
fighting for our homeland, they [sic] were fighting for slavery.”) (last updated Sept. 26, 2017, 12:40 AM).
293
Brown et al., supra note 289.
294
Sears, supra note 292.
295
See Simon Romero, ‘The Lees Are Complex’: Descendants Grapple with a Rebel General’s Legacy,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/us/lee-family-confederate-monumentslegacy.html (suggesting that this is in an effort to distance the family name from the Charlottesville,
Virginia white supremacist marches).
296
Id. The “Lost Cause” is a modern Confederate sympathizer movement that fosters the image of an
idyllic, pastoral South that pursued noble “American” aims. The movement strives to obscure historical
facts such as the overarching purposes of the Confederacy being secession from America and the
continuation of slavery. See Keneally, supra note 240.
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Id.
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Id.
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it.’ ”300 Such statements reveal the nuances of the removal debate at the state level; and a
balance must be struck that is both palatable to the public as well as to the officials.
2.

North Carolina

North Carolina is a state that has managed to propose measured suggestions to
handling Confederate statue removal despite having limited legislative recourse.301
Governor Roy Cooper asked that certain Confederate monuments be removed from
Capitol grounds to an alternative location—the Bentonville Battlefield historic site—thus
striking a balance between preservation of history and remedying the stain of white
supremacy that Confederate statues represent to modern society.302 However, Governor
Cooper’s proposal must be approved by the North Carolina Historical Commission
(Historical Commission), a government body given the power to control the removal,
relocation, or alteration of “objects of remembrance” pursuant to a 2015 state law. 303 The
2015 state law confers a great deal of responsibility on the Historical Commission,
mandating that state-owned monuments can only be relocated “when appropriate
measures are required by the State” to preserve them, or if removal is necessary for
construction.304 Due to the wide variety of interested groups and perspectives, members
of the Historical Commission were perplexed as to the best way to proceed with respect
to the monuments and whether or not to remove them at all.305 The acting Chairwoman of
the Historical Commission, Mary Lynn Bryan, stated, “We’re really not used to . . .
having issues that are this deep and this problematic coming before us . . . without having
an opportunity to look carefully at the ramifications of what we’re doing.”306 Adding to
the debate, North Carolina House Speaker Tim Moore sent a memorandum on monument
removal to the Historical Commission suggesting that “ ‘preservation’ of the monuments
should be narrowly interpreted and that it doesn’t apply to limiting their ‘potential for
exposure to protest or criminal activity.’ ”307 Despite this guidance—and because of the
unusual legislative check which prevents the North Carolina governor from acting
decisively on the matter—the Historical Commission, overcome with the weight of its
responsibility, postponed deciding on Governor Cooper’s proposal to remove the statues
to a designated historical site.
The North Carolina public is of mixed opinion. Some interest groups308 advocate
for adding more monuments309 instead of removing existing ones.310 One citizen opposed

300

Id.
Matthew Burns, Commission Delays Decision on Moving Confederate Statues, WRAL,
https://www.wral.com/commission-delays-decision-on-moving-confederate-statues/16966277/ (last
updated July 13, 2018).
302
Id.
303
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1(a) (2015) (“[A] monument, memorial, or work of art owned by the State
may not be removed, relocated, or altered in any way without the approval of the North Carolina Historical
Commission.”).
304
§ 100-2.1(b)(1).
305
Travis Fain, Cooper Administration Files to Move Confederate Monuments from Capitol, WRAL (Sept.
8, 2017), http://www.wral.com/cooper-administration-files-to-move-confederate-monuments-/16935662/.
306
Burns, supra note 301.
307
Id.
308
One such group is the “Sons of Confederate Veterans.” Id.
301
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to destroying the statues stated that he thought that “history is important,” that “[y]ou
have to be able to look back to know where you’re moving forward,” and that “the
statues represent a negativity in terms of history.”311 Meanwhile, another citizen appeared
to favor removing the statues, stating that “these statues have been in place for a long
time representing hate, representing racism, representing the fact that the South fought for
slavery, to keep slavery.”312 It appears that at least one government official, Governor
Cooper, sympathizes with the latter category of opinion, given his proposal to relocate
the Confederate statues.
Governor Cooper’s proposed relocation of the statues to the Bentonville Battlefield
historic site may be the best compromise to resolve this issue in his state, given that it is
unlikely that state laws would allow for a more extreme alternative. 313 An unusual
provision in the state statute dictates that a monument, if relocated, “shall be relocated to
a site of similar prominence, honor, visibility, availability, and access that are within the
boundaries of the jurisdiction from which it was relocated.”314 This means that,
functionally, the legislature intended for monuments to be thrust upon the citizenry’s
vantage point. What Governor Cooper has proposed,315 then, is a clever way to get the
monuments away from the civic center of the capital—thus, away from the community’s
view at large—and move them instead to a historic site, where people who wish to learn
about “history” may do so of their own volition. In doing so, Governor Cooper has not
been paralyzed by state law, but has instead used it to strike a balance of community
interests by fitting the relocation site under the technicalities of the state law.316
The Historical Commission stated it would revisit the proposal in the spring of
2018, and ultimately came to a decision317 in August 2018 on the heels of protestors
taking down a Confederate statue, Silent Sam, from the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill campus.318 Governor Cooper commented that “[t]he actions that toppled
Silent Sam bear witness to the strong feelings many North Carolinians have about
A concept I will be calling a “counter-proliferation” approach to historical preservation, which calls for
adding more context and content to the historical dialogue via more monuments commemorating different
perspectives.
310
Fain, supra note 305.
311
Burns, supra note 301.
312
Id.
313
Kovvali, supra note 248, at 82 (suggesting that North Carolina’s statute is “designed to prevent
removal”).
314
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 100-2.1(b) (2015).
315
Fain, supra note 305.
316
See id. (“Bentonville, the site of the largest Civil War battle in North Carolina, fits these
requirements.”).
317
The North Carolina Historical Commission came to a resolution shortly before publication. They
decided that three Confederate monuments will remain on the North Carolina Capitol grounds, but that
there will be “newly added context about slavery and civil rights.” The commission voted 10–1 to
“reinterpret the three monuments with adjacent signs about ‘the consequences of slavery’ and the
‘subsequent oppressive subjugation of African American people.’ ” Waggoner & Robertson, supra note
249; see also Vanessa Romo, After a Year of Rising Tensions, Protesters Tear Down Confederate Statue on
UNC Campus, NPR (Aug. 21, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/21/640435962/after-a-yearof-rising-tensions-protesters-tear-down-confederate-statue-on-unc-c (describing the take-down of Silent
Sam by protestors at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in August 2018).
318
Waggoner & Robertson, supra note 249.
309
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Confederate monuments. . . . [P]rotesters concluded that their leaders would not—could
not—act on the frustration and pain it caused.”319 This months-long decision was finally
prompted by the divisive actions of a public tired of remaining unheard,320 and shows the
influence that public unrest can have on forcing the hand of change.
3.

Bound by Balance

In general, the normative conclusions as to how various local governments might
resolve the issues surrounding Confederate monuments—including the state governments
of Virginia and North Carolina—all point to balancing. The key to striking the correct
balance between a governmental position and changing public opinion is to assess the
unique needs of the locality. Confederate monument removal is not a one-size-fits-all
issue; rather, it is one that necessitates consideration of a locality’s history—good and
bad—and the current governing laws, as well as the direction in which the law might
develop. The options are several, ranging from outright removal to relocation, adaptation,
modification, and new, commemorative creation. What can be gleaned from studying
different states’ approaches is that time is a salient touchstone of public opinion. It can
serve both as a tool that embraces change as well as a weapon to hold onto a particular
vision of the past. Factions will always arise and stand in opposition to each other; such is
the wisdom of Madison.321 However, local initiatives can be instituted that allow the
government to move forward and ameliorate the problems of one side versus the other. It
is an ongoing conversation between a government official and their electorate. Laws may
adapt or laws may restrict; navigating this tension is the real challenge. As with so many
issues of divergent opinion and what government ought and ought not to do, the concern
is deeply local.
E.

Federal Initiatives and Constraints: Washington, D.C., The White House, and
Beyond

Despite America standing for a vision of public unity and individual freedom, the
U.S. Capitol building in Washington, D.C. still houses statues of generals that fought on
behalf of the Confederacy for the preservation of slavery.322 Presently, there is debate
among the House of Representatives and members of the Senate as to how to remedy the
oxymoronic problem of housing bronze generals who fought for secession at the building
that symbolizes America’s states coming together. Representative Barbara Lee and
Senator Cory Booker penned the Confederate Monument Removal Act and submitted it
to Congress: the legislation would ban statues of individuals who participated in the
Confederate rebellion from the Capitol’s National Statuary Hall and other public areas
within the building.323 While this seems like a sensible move, critics have insinuated that
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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L.A. TIMES EDITORIAL BOARD, supra note 246.
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Id.; see also Jordain Carney, Dems File Bill to Remove Confederate Statues from Capitol, HILL (Sept. 7,
2017 6:51 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/349737-dems-file-bill-to-remove-confederate-statuesfrom-capitol (“Under the Democratic proposal, states would be able to reclaim their statues. Any statues
that are not reclaimed would be given to the Smithsonian.”).
320

80

Vol. 14:1]

Maliha Ikram

legislation such as this is in fact under-inclusive.324 Functionally, it would bar “certain
villains—rebel soldiers,” while simultaneously allowing other negative historical figures
to remain, such as individuals who “brutalized Native Americans.325
This dichotomy in removal versus preservation has led to the general attitude in
Washington, D.C. that the issue of unseemly monuments should generally be left to
the states.326 The pushback from preservationists has often been along the lines of: “If we
take down our Confederate statues today, we’ll have to take down statues of our slaveowning Founding Fathers tomorrow.”327 To this point, the argument for anti-paternalism
measures begins to have some salience: society should be afforded the ability to discern
the difference between various symbolic “sins” of the past.328 Additionally, worries arise
as to what might happen if using removal precedent becomes commonplace: different
factions may purge from public view different statues of different Americans, all
depending on who is in power and what political views are in fashion at the time. Such
actions may inhibit a mature and sophisticated discussion of our culture’s dual nature of
liberators and enslavers, freedom-lovers and foreign invaders, protectors and genocidal
killers.”329
Still, there is a very strong argument to be made for doing away with hateful
symbols in public spaces: these memorials and statues represent the worst of America’s
past.330 But because the heart of the matter is fundamentally local, there is reluctance at
the federal level to pass legislation that sets national precedent 331 Currently, only states
can remove statues in the National Statuary Hall Collection; a statue can be replaced “if
the state legislature and governor approve a resolution to do so and if it has been
displayed in the Capitol for at least a decade.”332 A state government should know its
people and thus should know where they stand in relation to the scars and triumphs of
American history.333
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Id.; shortly before publication, it was announced that following the aftermath of Charlottesville’s white
supremacist rally, the Federal government will be paying to protect Confederate cemeteries across
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16, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/346710-black-lawmakers-say-confederate-statuesshould-come-out-of-capitol.
333
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A “Presidential” Perspective

As members of the Congressional Black Caucus call for removal of Confederate
statues from the U.S. Capitol,334 President Trump has voiced pushback.335 Congressional
Black Caucus Chairman, Cedric Richmond, and Mississippi Representative, Bennie
Thompson, both expressed that “Confederate memorabilia” does not have a place in the
U.S. Capitol, as it represents a time of racial animus.336 President Trump, however,
rejected any initiatives to remove the statues, asking at a press conference in Trump
Tower, “[W]here does it stop?”337 Some members of the Black Caucus are advocating for
more varied statues from other parts of United States history alongside the Confederate
monuments this would “revise and supplement history . . . . The goal should be revision
and inclusion as opposed to the obliteration of the nation’s history,” Representative Hank
Johnson’s spokesman said.338 This latter solution may be the best way to balance the
unfavorable response from the President. He claims, “They’re trying to take away our
culture. . . . These things have been there for 150 years, for a hundred years . . . . Weak,
weak people.”339 Though it is unclear whether the President fully comprehends the
impact these “things” have on minorities, as long as his is the dominant national voice
and U.S. Capitol rules regarding statue removal remain in place,340 it is up to
Congressional representatives to push for striking the appropriate removal–preservation
balance in their home states.341
VI. Outcomes and Proposed Solutions
The largest source of discomfort with Confederate statues and monuments is that,
for many, they represent a time of hateful racism, oppression, and violence. They serve as
334

See supra Part V-E.
Recently, President Trump praised Confederate general and slavery supporter General Robert E. Lee, at
a campaign rally in Ohio in October 2018, stating that he was a “true fighter” and a “great general.”
Notably, a descendant of Robert E. Lee, Reverend Robert Lee IV, made a public statement that he was
“disheartened to hear Donald Trump, our president, make comments about Robert E. Lee as a great
general, as an honorable man . . . . These were far from the truth.” Emily C. Singer, Trump Praises
Confederate General Robert E. Lee at Ohio Campaign Rally, MIC (Oct. 13, 2018),
https://mic.com/articles/191877/trump-confederate-general-robert-e-lee-ohio-rally#.OIU4Wxkb9.
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See Cristina Marcos, GOP Lawmaker Breaks with Trump, Says Confederate Statues Should Come
Down, HILL (Aug. 25, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/347994-gop-lawmaker-breakswith-trump-says-confederate-statues-should-come-down (reporting that Representative Sean Duffy of
Wisconsin stated that localities should choose “whether they should have those statues up, whether they
should be removed to museums or to other parks . . . .” Representative Tom Rooney of Florida expressed to
the Hill that “Confederate monuments in the Capitol should be removed and relocated to a museum or
battlefield. Otherwise, the statues should be given context as symbols of slavery . . . .” It is particularly
important for states to remove Confederate statues from the Capitol, Representative Rooney expressed,
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reminders of the horrors of slavery that plagued America’s past and tower over
communities that have been shaped by those who supported the losing side of the Civil
War.342 In short, Confederate monuments often evoke uneasiness, even disgust, in their
viewers. But despite all of this, the correct, albeit somewhat unsatisfying, result should be
a case-by-case analysis undertaken by each state government with regard to its collection
of Confederate monuments, with priority given to protecting them from outright
destruction or removal—as removal carries with it the risk of erasing the past at the
expense of understanding today why progress is more important than ever.
In this vein, the renowned French scholar of the eighteenth century, Henri
Grégoire—known as Abbé Grégoire—devoted much of his life to advocating for
preserving cultural heritage, long before it was codified in the law.343 Grégoire saw
cultural property and heritage as integral to national identity and political life, saying that
“[t]hose who were willing to see . . . artifacts destroyed . . . were imperiling the most
important symbols of the national identity . . . .”344 Although Grégoire is heralded as a
champion of public art as protectable community heritage,345 his arguments neatly
encompass the Confederate statue dilemma.346As unsavory as it may seem in its
application to Confederate statues, Grégoire’s legacy rests in his foresight, his ability to
see the power that public artifacts of cultural significance can have, even if they are
troubling.347 Grégoire believed that a true “patriot” of a nation should not be complacent
and forgetful with respect to his nation’s past. Rather, he thought that “[t]he true patriot
embraces the spirit of liberty, encouraging full realization of the individual’s own talent
and creativity by protecting those things that express the spirit and that can serve as
models and inspirations for the future.”348 The impetus must be placed on the words that
contour futurity. To eradicate symbols of a heritage’s past is to stunt development in the
future.349 The struggle is one between knowledge and ignorance.350 The goal is not to
Stone Mountain, for example, is the “literally the largest” Confederate monument “problem” in the
world. The monument is a carving of Southern Civil War leaders “etched across three acres of granite” on
Stone Mountain’s northern face. The mountain’s engraving has come to play a role in Georgia’s upcoming
governor’s race, in which some candidates are calling the public mural a “blight” on the state that needs to
be removed. Richard Fausset, Stone Mountain: The Largest Confederate Monument Problem in the World,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/us/stone-mountain-confederateremoval.html.
343
See Sax, supra note 192, at 1142 (suggesting that Grégoire’s personal desire to protect cultural values
grew into a matter of public concern).
344
Id. at 1156.
345
Kathryn R. L. Rand, Nothing Lasts Forever: Toward a Coherent Theory in American Preservation
Law, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 280 (“Gregoire suggested that expressions of talent and creativity are
the fruits of liberty and should be preserved as such, without regard to their origin. Gregoire saw art as the
product of individual liberty, not of political regimes.”).
346
See LEVINSON, supra note 283, at 112–14; see also Linenthal, supra note 258, at 250–51 (describing
Levinson’s book as analyzing the “production and function of cultural memory as expressed in
memorials”).
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Sax, supra note 192, at 1156.
348
Id. at 1156–57.
349
See id. at 1157 (presenting Grégoire’s conception of “past achievement as a form of necessary capital
that the citizens of the newly liberated nation would have to employ to create their new society” and
suggesting that bad history can be used as fuel and motivation for a better future).
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glorify, but to inform the public so that it can continue adding to the narrative and forge
its own destiny. Grégoire understood the problem of cultural erasure even in the
eighteenth century, believing that “to toss onto the revolutionary bonfires all the works of
the past was . . . to demean the notion of liberation by converting it into a celebration of
willful ignorance.”351 The active, thinking person needs to face challenging ideas to
understand true liberty and become, in the words of John Stuart Mill, “a beautiful object
of contemplation.”352
Though they represent pain for many, the removal or retention of Confederate
statues and monuments should be handled cautiously, by balancing community interests
at large with the historical significance they represent.353 One thing is certain: most, if not
all, of the monuments cannot stand as they are. This is because the “history” many of
them are espousing is not history at all, but a skewed rhetoric that favors the Confederate
South.354 Thus, modifications to the monuments or other remedial measures must be
taken to raise the statues to the level of historical accuracy and the significance of these
monuments to the South355 rather than a skewed rhetoric that romanticizes the
Confederacy. This means that a traditional public trust framework that favors complete
preservation of these monuments for public “enjoyment” cannot be employed. Because of
their significance to history and American identity, however, these statutes should not all
be removed and destroyed either. Rather, their important role in the development of our
national identity would be better served by “addendums” to their messages, as discussed
below. The government should handle the display, modification, or removal of these
public works by balancing accurate historical preservation with our present state of
cultural awareness. To this end, the local government in charge of modifying or
relocating the monuments must take its locality’s view into account and pursue the
solution that makes the most sense for its citizenry.356 This is not an unchecked power,
however, as various factions may dictate changes in governmental office or policies as to
what those historical preservationist moves will look like.
Through careful consideration, the proposed solutions for the statues may range
from modifications for historical accuracy, to counter-proliferation approaches, to
outright removal.357 The theoretical framework of assessing the struggles of factions
among the electorate and their government officials as one of balancing local values is
critical to these proposals. However, without stepping back to analyze a locality’s
competing interests and its true motivations, it is difficult to find the best solution to the
351
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Library pbk. ed. 2002).
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See LEVINSON, supra note 283, at 112–14.
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The artist is not an interested party due to the works being in the public domain. The division of public
opinion renders the works unworthy of cultural heritage protection, as there is not enough consensus that
the monuments form the identity of a locality or a have a bond to the locality. Thus, the government must
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problem of Confederate monument preservation. By establishing up front, either through
laws or policies, that Confederate monuments do not rise to the level of shared cultural
heritage protection under the public trust doctrine, the local government can lay the
groundwork for approaching Confederate monument preservation on a case-by-case
basis. I propose the following solutions as salient options for state and local governments
to try. They are suggestions rooted in paying attention to the needs of the electorate, and
none of them can be pursued adequately unless local community values are
contemplated. In this process, attention must be given by local governments to the value
of art and identity to the locality, both past and present. The hope is that one or a
combination of these remedies will improve the Confederate monument issue for states
and mitigate the warring opinions of factions of the electorate and the elected government
officials. Naturally, to believe that the American public can ever achieve “genuine
consensus” is “naïve in the extreme.”358 It is true: not all people can be pleased. Thus, the
main consideration for how to move forward must be preserving as much historical art
for the community as possible while ensuring that the art’s placement be appropriate and
that the “history” be meaningful, rather than an archaic sham meant to divide citizens.
A. A Historical Approach: History Museums
When it comes to defenses of Confederate statues under a “historical preservation”
rationale, if the community has spoken and the government would be blatantly at odds
with it by retaining the work as it stands, the one useful compromise may be to move the
statues to a designated museum or historical space. Doing so would effectively
“seculariz[e]” the message that the Confederate statues or monuments represent by
isolating them in a place designated for active contemplation of their meanings.359 This
approach envisages a government that is unwilling to physically modify360 the
monuments at all and instead wants to leave them the way they are. Because this is
problematic to the public at large—which may have factions that dislike seeing the
monuments—if no alteration is to be done due to a perspective that favors completely
preserving the artifact, the statue or monument should be absorbed by a local or national
history museum or a designated historical space.361 This gives the community members a
choice—if they wish to see this form of “history,” then they can enter the museum or
historical space of their own volition.362 Doing so spares members of the public who view
these statues as symbols of hatred or oppression from being subjected to them on a daily
358

Id. at 130–31.
Linenthal, supra note 258, at 257–58. “Secularize” here does not mean removing religious messaging;
rather, it means stripping monuments of their pro-Confederate meaning by relocating them to spaces where
their history can be contextualized.
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more accurate historical account. See infra Part VI-6.
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New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu stated, “[W]e can begin a new chapter of New Orleans’s history by
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basis as they would if they remained in open public centers meant for all citizens of the
locality.363 While relocation to a museum or historical space is not always a perfect
remedy,364 it at least stops the tyranny of the monuments’ permanent presence in public
spaces and ameliorates social divisions by enhancing the public’s shared experience
within the built landscape. This is likely the most palatable solution to the factions
warring over Confederate monuments: it preserves “history” while removing the
monuments from decontextualized open spaces.
B. A Modification Approach
For those monuments that are not on their face a distressing depiction—such as
plaques of text that list Confederate battles or victors—the harm caused by these works
may be ameliorated by placing plaques of equal size and communicative significance
alongside them, thus mitigating any untruthful exposition.365 If additional text is
provided, it should articulate the truth behind the history of the original monument,
recognizing that it enshrines and privileges one version of history over another.
Additionally, any offensive text could be modified by “sandblasting” it from the
monument, thus leaving either a blank space (to allow the public to interpret the
monument for itself) or a replacement engraving with a more truthful account of the
history being commemorated.366 While this modification approach may not be farreaching in that some Confederate statues may not have inscriptions that can easily be
modified, it may be an important tool for monuments that contain plaques with
interpretations rather than accurate historical accounts.
C. A Counter-Proliferation Approach
A popular new theory for handling Confederate statues and monuments is one that
proposes adding more monuments to the mix.367 The goal of these proposals is to nullify
the negative effects of Confederate monuments by way of counter-proliferation, either by
erecting monuments that tell varied narratives of the historical accounts that existing
monuments claim to represent or by adding monuments that represent a different chapter
of history altogether (such as the Civil Rights Movement). 368 The messaging that would
See Clowney, supra note 243, at 57 (“The distortions and omissions [of monuments] ultimately drive
black citizens from important public spaces and discourage their full participation in the polity.”).
364
See Linenthal, supra note 258, at 259 (recognizing that, sometimes, monuments are too “charged” with
meaning to be contained in a “dispassionate” museum exhibit).
365
See id. at 257 (writing that Levinson suggested that interpretive plaques be attached to Confederate
monuments to show a balanced and accurate telling of different sides of history; interpretive plaques may
“call[] into question the very reason for erecting a monument”).
366
Id. at 259.
367
This is akin to Justice Louis Brandeis’s “more speech” rationale for combating social evils. See Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). Justice Brandeis’s “more speech” rationale was later
adopted by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) in the form of the “imminent
lawless action” requirement for speech to be regulated.
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Linenthal, supra note 258, at 258 (writing that Levinson considered “the erection of a monument to
those enslaved by Texas,” for example, to mitigate the lopsided rhetoric of existing Confederate
monuments).
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result from juxtaposing Confederate statues with their Civil Rights-oriented counterparts
would be an important shift toward a more meaningful historical balance. The overall
purpose then is to fill the public space with more voices that cancel out the harsh effects
of the Confederate monuments; this means that the overall message to the public from the
monuments will effectively be net neutral. Context is everything,369 and removing the
stain of one dominant voice from shared public spaces will arguably allow for the public
to derive their own meaningful interpretations of history.
D. An Outright Removal Approach
Outright removal of Confederate monuments and statues is the riskiest approach, as
it destroys or removes the statues and monuments altogether. In many ways, to
simultaneously advocate for preserving public art that has risen to the level of cultural
significance and also argue for removing historic Confederate statues and monuments
seems to be a strangely inconsistent position. This is because Confederate monuments,
perhaps more so than general public artwork, have come to represent history in addition
to cultural heritage; indeed, they are historical artifacts. Of course, these monuments may
represent a skewed history that wrongly glorifies acts many feel should be condemned,
but this alone does not exclude them from our collective heritage—rather, they are
reminders of where we came from and how much further we have yet to go. For this
reason, a policy of outright removal or destruction of Confederate monuments should be
used sparingly by local governments and only in cases where the negative impact of the
monument significantly outweighs any potential benefits.370 For those works that can be
dealt with by any of the aforementioned methods, those approaches should be taken.371
However, sometimes the depiction in a monument is so egregious or unjustifiable that
outright removal may be the only appropriate route. These are cases of heightened
distaste, such as a depiction of a slaveholder doing violence to a slave, a depiction of a
war general who was a ruthless murderer, or a celebration of figures like the Ku Klux
Klan advocating for genocide or racial violence.372 In these extreme situations, there is
369

See Benjamin Means, Book Note, Monuments to the Past in a Leveling Wind, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1617,
1626 (1999) (reviewing SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES (Benjamin Lee ed., 1998)) (“[T]he meaning of monuments is not after all written in stone, but is
subject to interpretation and reinterpretation.”).
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Removal can happen in two ways: formal removal by the city or state or informal removal by the
people. In August 2018, the latter form was employed as the public took Confederate monument removal
into its own hands: protestors brought down Silent Sam, a monument dedicated to Civil War soldiers
standing on the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Tensions had been rising in North Carolina as
to the role of Confederate monuments in public spaces; more specifically, “[c]alls for [the statue’s] removal
grew louder following the deadly white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Va., last August. However,
university officials have maintained that a state law designed to protect a ‘monument, memorial or work of
art owned by the state’ prohibited the removal of the divisive symbol.” Romo, supra note 317. This recent
occurrence demonstrates that America is still deeply struggling with the issue of the Confederacy and how
its commemoration in public art fits into the framework of modern democracy. When citizens feel they are
unheard by their government, they can—and will—take removal measures on their own.
371
See supra Part VI-A-C.
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See, e.g., Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, 157 F. Supp. 3d 573, 581 (E.D. La. 2016), aff’d sub
nom., Monumental Task Comm. V. Chao, 678 F. App’x 250 (5th Cir. 2017) (In this case, a statue
commemorated the white supremacist organization, the White League, attacking and killing members of
the New Orleans’ first integrated police force.).
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less historical value;373 instead, the aim is rightly seen as a gratuitous or inflammatory
depiction with a message of oppression or glorification of racism. For these statues and
monuments, removal may be the best way to acknowledge the interests of the public.
This is because the daily reminder is so painful to the people whose ancestors suffered
fates similar to those depicted by the statues that the reasons for removing them outweigh
the reasons for preserving them.
E. Power to the People
The government undoubtedly has responsibilities to its voting public. Its duties
necessarily contemplate the preservation, removal, or adaptation of public works.
Confederate statues and monuments are a form of public art, but are perhaps more aptly
defined as objects of history. This designation informs the duties that the government
owes to its electors, with respect to these monuments both from a preservationist
standpoint, as well as a social one. The balancing of the public’s valuation of the
monuments and the state’s perceived historical interests involves careful attention to the
cultural landscape of the locality. Public space tells stories in itself, shaping how people
in the community think and are socialized.374 Civic spaces are loaded with messages. As
a consequence, each local government must carefully consider its own contribution to the
built environment and which Confederate monument removal or modification strategy
makes the most sense for the needs of the populace which it governs. In certain extreme
circumstances, the public interest in outright removal may make the most sense. For
instance, an annual city poll may reveal that the majority faction has shifted to supporting
Confederate monument removal, while perhaps earlier polls indicated a preference for
preservation. This places the impetus on the government to acknowledge the public. If a
government does not adhere to the citizenry’s voice, the changing factions may employ
the classic Madisonian remedy until they are heard: voting officials out of office. Though
legal precedent and modern interpretations of Confederate monument removal favor local
governmental control, the public always remains a significant player, pushing the
direction of the fight.375

See Levinson, supra note 245, at 1094 (“[O]ne must always ask whether a monument to the Confederate
dead—and the articulation of secessionist constitutional theory—is equivalent to memorializing those who
fought to maintain chattel slavery and the abuse of African Americans.”).
374
See Clowney, supra note 243, at 3 (“[C]areful scholarship in the social sciences demonstrate [sic] that
the landscape operates much like a tectonic fault; although its presence is seldom scrutinized, its impact
remains powerful.”).
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A new National Memorial for Peace and Justice opened to on April 26, 2018, paying homage to African
American victims of lynching via monuments. See https://museumandmemorial.eji.org/memorial.; see also
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/lynching-memorial-montgomery-alabama/index.html (The Memorial
allows for counties to take replicas of the deceased back to their locales as a form of remembrance and
accountability. “Surrounding the memorial, replicas of each of the monuments will also be on display. Each
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CONCLUSION

The substantive conflicts of interest that long-term preservation of public art pose
to a locality’s elected governmental officials, the artist(s), and the public comprise a rich
debate informed by many voices. The varied opinions as to how to handle the
preservation, adaptation, or removal of public art both qualify and harmonize with each
other. Naturally, different scenarios dictate the outcome of whose opinion controls. In the
end, the debate over each interested party comes down to a balancing act. Any analysis of
public art necessitates correctly balancing the interests of each party to achieve an
outcome in accordance with the overall spirit of the law and goal of cultivating cultural
heritage. And in some instances, the existing legal framework must be stretched to
encompass assets of heritage that have not yet been given their own laws.
In general, when public art is determined to be a mainstay of a locality, then the
public art should be held in public trust for the people. This determination is refined by
the presence or absence of the artist, who may be able to control what happens to his or
her work under VARA, provided that the work meets the statute’s qualifying criteria.376
If the artist is living and does retain his or her rights, the length and nature of the art’s
maintenance will be cabined by the artist’s vision for his or her work. Thus, in this
instance, maintenance will be according to the artist’s wishes. This right also extends to
derivative works based on the interested artist’s work, limiting what the public or
government may expressively do with the art.
If, however, the artist is deceased or otherwise does not retain rights in his or her
public art, then control over the art should belong to the public under a modern reading of
the public trust doctrine.377 The government will have to hold the public art in trust for
the people if it has reached the level of embodying cultural heritage for the locality. The
hook for qualification under public trust will depend on whether the community has
embraced the art as part of its identity.378 If the art has not attained this marker of
heritage, or the public decides that the art is no longer of value to the community, then
the government need not hold it in trust and may dispose of or retain the work as it deems
appropriate.
While the aforementioned checks and balances on long-term preservation of
public art are informative, the pressing issue of Confederate statue and monument
removal contemplates a slightly different framework379—one entrenched in local or state
government control. In such scenarios, it is the government’s obligation to weigh
community interests as well as its own historical preservation goals. There are a number
of routes the government can take in making its ultimate decision, but at its core it is a
balancing act that keeps its finger on the pulse of public opinion. Though majority
factions shift and there may be years of lag between governing officials’ views and their
electorate’s, the system of democratic voting ultimately empowers the public despite it
having a seemingly subservient role in Confederate monument decision-making.

376

See supra Part II.
See supra Part IV.
378
See id.
379
A framework that excludes both any interest from the original author/artist and the “cultural heritage”
signifier.
377
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The outlines of power are opaque, but the parties—the governing officials, the
artist(s), and the public—all find a meaningful role when it comes to rights surrounding
long-term maintenance of public art. Perhaps Idyllic Isle will find an amicable remedy;
for all one knows, the government may adapt to the current pressures of its citizens, or
poll them for their present take on Bliss Is Ignorance. Conceivably, the community may
come to a consensus over whether or not the work is indicative of their cultural heritage,
thereby informing their recommendation to the government as to whether to hold the
work in trust or use discretion over its future treatment. Given that shift, the government
may consult with the artist to assess his feelings about the work’s continued presence or
removal, thus respecting his rights under VARA before taking any action. Alternatively,
Bliss Is Ignorance may be modified by adding a placard that explains how society has
shifted and that the sculpture merely represents a snapshot of history from one
perspective. Moreover, the work may be added to a local historical space or moved to a
slightly less public location. Instead, the artist may wish to remove the art altogether, or
may otherwise be persuaded that adding more artwork around Bliss Is Ignorance
contextualizes his work for future generations. The outcomes are not always clear, but all
parties have a salient voice in terms of whose opinion governs where. Ours may not be a
perfect world, but by maintaining public art, it can at least be a meaningful one.

90

